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D E M O C R A C Y  W I T H  C H I N E S E  CHARACTERIST ICS:  





Daniel A. Bell 
Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong 
SCENE I. The Discussion Begins 
Beijing University, June 3, 2007. SAM DEMO, program officer for a US.-based pro- 
democracy think tank, steps into the office of PROFESSOR WANC to begin a prearranged 
interview. PROFESSOR WANC, a respected political philosopher at Beijing University in 
his mid-forties, has been selected to participate in a constitutional convention due to 
begin the following day in Beijing. 
DEMO: [Out of breath] Thank you for receiving me today. I realize it must be a very 
busy time now. [Pause.] I'm sorry I'm late. I was stuck in traffic for over two hours. 
WANG: I guess that's the price a society pays for economic development. One 
reads in the textbooks that modernization is supposed to increase the pace of living, 
but the opposite may well be the case. 
DEMO:[Laughs] It could be worse: in the mid-1 990s, the average commuter in 
Bangkok had to bring a potty in his car. But the traffic situation improved after the 
economic crash. [Short pause.] Well, I still find it hard to believe we're here to dis- 
cuss the prospects for democratic political reform in China, and no need to worry 
about the secret police. Think about it. Five or six years ago, who would have been 
able to anticipate the possibility of a national convention designed to formulate a 
democratic constitution appropriate for China?' And on June Fourth, no less! 
WANC: In retrospect, it may not seem that remarkable. Remember we had a fairly 
open debate about political reform in the late 1980s, prior to the Tiananmen mas- 
sacre. People tend to forget that the Communist Party itself set up a Political Reform 
Office which sometimes evaluated radical proposals for political change. And 
Deng's death seemed to open up some possibilities. New signs of tolerance emerged 
at the Communist Party's fifteenth Congress in October 1997, and intellectuals began 
to speak out for political reform once again.2 Besides, the Party couldn't postpone 
the day of reckoning forever, marking the days prior to the June Fourth anniversary 
with detentions, tighter surveillance of leading dissidents, controlling access to Tian- 
anmen Square, and so on. Once again, it's easy to say this in retrospect, but in my 
view it was inevitable that the Party would apologize for the Tiananmen massacre, 
just as the KMT apologized for the February 28, 1947, massacre (though it took over 
four decades) and the Korean government indicted those responsible for the 1980 
Kwangju massacre more than ten years after the fact. And after Li Peng had retired, it 
was no longer possible to hold back demands for political reform. 
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DEMO: Well, stranger things have happened. How many of us managed to pre- 
dict the sudden collapse of the Soviet empireI3 or the swift and peaceful dismantling 
of apartheid in South Africa? [Short pause.] I'm still not too clear, however, about 
your proposal for tomorrow's constitutional convention. I've heard it said that you 
favor a democratic political system "with Chinese characteristics." What does this 
phrase mean? I'm well aware that Chinese reformers typically argue for democracy 
as a means for strengthening national powefl-in contrast, say, to American theo- 
rists, who tend to justify democracy with reference to the value of individual free- 
dom5-but this is a dispute over the justification for a democratic political system. 
I've yet to hear an argument, I must admit, that a unique kind of democratic system is 
appropriate for this part of the world, one that differs to a significant extent from 
Western-style democratic institutions. In other words, both Asians and Westerners 
seem to agree on the political ideal, though they may typically do so for different 
reasons. 
WANG: Let me try to explain my scheme. I do in fact have a proposal for a dif- 
ferent kind of democracy, a democratic political system that's particularly appro- 
priate for the Chinese context. And tomorrow I'll try to persuade fellow Chinese, 
although I think foreigners can also come to appreciate my reasons for defending this 
scheme. 
DEMO: Please elaborate. 
[On the Need for Capable and Far-sighted Rulers in Modern Societies] 
WANG: Well, we agree that a democratic system at minimum must include regular 
elections based on universal franchise. The aim is to give ordinary citizens a say, no 
matter how distant, in political decision making, and to hold political rulers ac- 
countable at the end of the day. But it's also the case that many relevant issues and 
policies in the political systems of modern societies have become so complex that 
most ordinary citizens can't even begin to make sound judgments. Does the man on 
the street really know the probable impact of increasing interest rates or reforming 
administrative law? The sheer complexity of public affairs in the modern era means 
that a substantial amount of decision-making power must be placed in the hands of 
an intellectually agile and well-qualified elite, almost as a functional requirement of 
modern political societies. More than ever before, there's a need for "brains" in 
government. 
DEMO: Fair enough. But on the other hand, many modern societies seem to 
function quite well with a democratic system. 
WANG: That's true. But those same societies also place substantial constraints on 
democratic majorities, presumably on the grounds that some things are better left to 
more "capable hands." I spent six years as a graduate student in the U.S., and I must 
say I was consistently shocked at the gap between the rhetoric of popular sover- 
eignty and the reality of rule by an intellectual elite. One antidemocratic device, of 
course, is the constitutional Bill of Rights enforced by unelected judges holding final 
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powers of review. The U.S. Supreme Court, as you know, has the power to override 
the decisions of elected politicians said to violate the U.S. Constitution. 
DEMO: Mmm, yes. Perhaps you can also support your argument with the less 
well known example of central banks in Western societies. In the U.S., for example, 
the Federal Reserve Board has the power to make monetary policy, which can have 
important economic effects such as influencing peoples' decisions to buy consumer 
d ~ r a b l e s . ~This secretive institution is explicitly insulated against interference by 
elected politicians, on the grounds that it must have the power to take tough eco- 
nomic decisions that benefit the country in the long run. So, for example, the Fed 
sometimes increases interest rates so as to ward off inflation, even if this means 
increasing unemployment. A more responsive central bank might not be able to act 
against the wishes of politicians who might find it in their interest to combat unem- 
ployment, whatever the long-term economic consequences. There seems to be an 
implicit understanding that secrecy and insulation from political pressure is essential 
to the successful conduct of monetary policy, and that most elected politicians have 
neither the competence nor the political wi l l  to make sound economic decisions.' 
WANG: Yes, that's a good example. 
DEMO: But keep in mind that "the people" still have the ultimate power. Super 
majorities have the power to amend the U.S. ConstitutionI8 though admittedly it's a 
time-consuming and difficult process. And Federal Reserve Board governors are 
appointed by the president and have to be confirmed by the Senate. 
WANG: I wonder if this "ultimate power" means much in p r a~ t i c e . ~  And when 
we look at the democratic political systems in East Asia, it seems that intellectual 
elites have an even greater say relative to elected officials. In Japan, meritocratically 
chosen bureaucrats continue to wield power and authority that would make even 
their semi-fictitious colleagues in Yes Minister envious. The political system em- 
powers them to make the most of the nation's policy, and they effectively answer to 
no one, including the nation's elected politicians.1° 
DEMO: But do you endorse this kind of system? Isn't there a need for more 
openness and accountability in the Japanese political system? There's no need to 
remind you of the Ministry of Finance's role in prolonging, if not causing, Japan's 
crippling economic crisis in the 1990s." And let's not mention that incident 
involving bureaucrats at the Health Ministry, who resisted allowing imports of steri- 
lized blood until 1985, well after they had been told of the risks of HIV contamina- 
tion. As a result, several hundred Japanese hemophiliacs died from AIDS.12 
WANG: Of  course intellectual elites make tragic mistakes, but so do elected pol- 
iticians. I worry about political systems which empower "feel good" politicians, who 
manage to get elected by promising the moon to their constituents-"we'll cut taxes 
and increase spending," or "full steam ahead with economic development," the 
story goes-and never mind the long-term consequences. Let future generations 
worry about massive deficits and ecological disasters. 
DEMO: Fair enough. But you may be overestimating the intelligence of some 
elected politicians. Not all of them consciously subordinate the long-term good for 
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short-term gain. Ronald Reagan, for example, seemed too intellectually feeble to 
even grasp the long-term implications of what he proposed. 
WANC:[Smiles] For better or for worse. He was playing with fire, but he did fuel 
an arms race that contributed to the economic collapse of the Soviet bloc. In any 
case, from my perspective the ideal is a political system that guarantees bright and 
farsighted rulers and yet holds them somewhat accountable for what they do. The 
problem with the Japanese system is that "bureaucrats"-in effect the nation's top 
political decision makers-decide things in secret and then can't be held responsi- 
ble when things go wrong. 
DEMO: We seem to have come a long way from democracy. A democratic sys- 
tem simply can't ensure that a country's top decision makers wil l be "bright and 
farsighted." The rulers are whoever the people say they are, and it must be assumed 
that ordinary citizens can generally be trusted to choose the right sorts of leaders. 
[A Confucian Tradition of Respect for a Ruling intellectual Elite] 
WANC: YOU see, this is  where cultural differences may be relevant. In East Asia, to put 
it a bit crudely, the tradition has been to place trust in competent and virtuous 
bureaucrats. As you may know, East Asian political culture has been shaped by the 
Confucian idea that public service is the way to achieve complete self-realization. 
There's a saying in the Confucian Analects. [Shortpause.] Let me try to translate: 
Tzu-lu asked about the qualities of a true gentleman. The Master said, He cultivates in 
himself the capacity to be diligent in his tasks. Tzu-lu said, Can he not go further than 
that? The Master said, He cultivates in himself the capacity to ease the lot of other people. 
Tzu-lu said, can he not go further than that? The Master said, He cultivates in himself the 
capacity to ease the lot of the whole populace. If he can do that, could even Yao or Shun 
find cause to criticize him? (14 :45)13 
Promoting the common good, according to this view, is life's highest achievement, 
and this sort of idea may have inspired the "best and brightest" in East Asia to 
compete for civil service appointments.14 Not surprisingly, occupants of bureau- 
cratic posts have typically been held in high regard by the population at large, in the 
same way that self-made entrepreneurs in the U.S. tend to be granted large amounts 
of respect. 
DEMO: Correct me if I am wrong, but Plato also proposed a political system of 
"rule by the wise." The value of political elitism is not foreign to the West, I can 
assure you. 
WANC: But there's a difference. Plato's philosopher-king is burdened with the 
task of public duty-true self-realization lies "outside the cave," in the realm of the 
ideal forms. The same goes for Aristotle, for whom intellectual contemplation is the 
highest pleasure. And when we turn to Christianity, the bias against "secular" public 
service is even more deeply felt-one lives, and suffers, in "the city of man" in order 
to find happiness in "the city of God." 1Shortpause.lNow, I don't mean to deny that 
some Chinese philosophical systems also devalue the political-Daoism comes to 
mindT5-but certainly the dominant philosophical tradition in East Asia values public 
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service over and above other activities. And all the world is promised to those who 
succeed. 
DEMO: I think you may be overestimating the sociological importance of philo- 
sophical texts. 
WANC: Perhaps. But recall that Confucian societies institutionalized a stable 
mechanism capable of producing, at least on occasion, what was widely seen as a 
"government of the best men"-China's famous two-thousand-year-old meritocratic 
civil service examination system. Entry into the civil service through competitive 
examination was open to all males, with few exceptions, and those who eventually 
succeeded at passing, often having to undertake half a lifetime of study to do so, 
were thought to be in sole possession of the moral and intellectual qualities neces- 
sary for public service. [Short pause.] Think about it. In the West, defenders of rule 
by an intellectual elite could do nothing more than argue in favor of their superior 
abilities in political-theory texts, universities, churches, and so on, whereas Con- 
fucians could actually prove themselves by succeeding in a fair and open examina- 
tion process. I think this helps to explain why scholar-bureaucrats were granted 
uncommon (by Western standards) amounts of legitimacy, respect-and power. 
DEMO: But look at what happened in China-the communists uprooted the tra- 
ditional value of rule by an intellectual elite and its institutional manifestations. 
There's no need to remind you of the Cultural Revolution. 
WANC: You're right, but ideology began to take a back seat to considerations of 
talent and expertise with the advent of economic reform. In the Deng reform era, 
intellectuals were again held in high esteem and regarded among the leaders of the 
country.16 And when we look at the May-June 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations 
-recall that over one million ordinary Beijing citizens participated in a movement 
that was led by students and intellectuals from China's most prestigious universities 
-it becomes clear that the value of respect for the leadership role of an intellectual 
elite was not killed off by the Cultural Rev~ lu t i on . ' ~  Of  course, it's much easier to 
trace philosophical and institutional continuity in other East Asian countries fortu- 
nate enough not to have experienced a full-scale Cultural Revolution.18 In Japan, the 
top candidates in the nationwide pre-university examination system enter the Law 
Faculty at Tokyo University, and upon graduation they obtain posts with the most 
prestigious government ministries. In Singapore, the top graduates from the National 
University compete not for prime jobs in the private sector but rather for the best jobs 
in government. And those who scored highest on their "A levels" are given govern- 
ment scholarships to study abroad at Princeton, Harvard, and such, and when they 
return to Singapore they're almost immediately given responsible positions in the 
public sector. Moreover, as a condition of having accepted the scholarship they're 
under a legal obligation to work for the government for a minimum of eight years. 
How's that for a productive use of talent! 
DEMO: Are you suggesting that China should revive the Confucian practice of 
rule by meritocratically chosen government bureaucrats? 
WANG: Not exactly. As I said, I favor some accountability for political decision 
making, which was lacking in traditional Confucian societies, and still seems to be 
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lacking in Japan and Singapore. And I think the political-talent selection procedures 
should be made more open than they currently are in East Asia. But I also want to 
preserve the Confucian political value of conferring respect and power to an intel- 
lectual elite, on the grounds that modern societies generally fare better if they're 
ruled by bright and farsighted public servants. So the challenge is to how to imple- 
ment dual commitments to democracy and rule by a public-spirited intellectual elite 
in a contemporary Chinese context. 
DEMO: [Intrigued, yet slightly skeptical] And what's the answer? 
SCENE II. The Alternatives 
WANC: Well, I racked my brains for many years trying to resolve this question. I 
considered various alternatives, but none seemed to offer a persuasive way out. 
[Short pause.] The solution, strangely enough, came to me one day as I was having 
lunch at the Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet at Tiananmen Square. 
DEMO: [Laughs] Why not? In the old days, philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rous- 
seau had sudden revelations under oak trees,lg but it seems to be getting more and 
more difficult to find greenery in Beijing. 
WANC: Of  course I'm not comparing myself to Rousseau, although I won't deny 
that it was a moment of tremendous excitement when I thought of this political 
arrangement. 
DEMO: [Getting more curious] Well, let's have it. 
WANC: The tricky part was how to institutionalize rule by an intellectual elite 
in an overall democratic context. I never had any difficulty with the question of 
institutionalizing the democratic component of the equation-any workable and 
legitimate political system in the modern era must, I think, include free and fair 
competitive elections. But how to ensure a "government of the best"? 
DEMO: What about letting the people decide? 
WANC: I'm not too sure about that. Sometimes politicians can only get elected by 
pandering to the short-term interests of the populace. In developing countries it's 
often easier to get elected by promising the conditions for rapid economic develop- 
ment, regardless of the ecological costs for future generations. In developed coun- 
tries, voters prefer politicians who favor policies that benefit the middle class and the 
rich, regardless of the impact on the poor. Or sometimes they promise to maintain 
economically unsustainable welfare benefits. 
DEMO: Democracy isn't perfect. But if the solution is  to give more power to an 
intellectual elite, then democratic elections may do the trick in East Asia. As you 
suggest, ordinary people have imbibed the ethic of respect for Confucian "gentle- 
men," so one should expect citizens to vote for such persons. 
WANC: That's possible. In Korea and Taiwan, for example, candidates for national 
office often flaunt their educational qualifications, apparently with the hope that 
people are more inclined to vote for a ruler with a Ph.D. from a prestigious univer- 
sity. But overall, the situation is not encouraging. In Japan, voters appear to be 
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swayed primarily by short-term material benefits, and still now, most political talent 
finds its way to the bureaucracy rather than the legislature. And even supposing 
that voters try to identify "Confucian" political rulers, they may not always be able 
to identify persons of character and ability. The Singapore government controls 
for this possibility by administering a battery of tests to PAP candidates, including 
an IQ test and other psychological tests to eliminate candidates who are self-
i n t e r e~ t e d . ~~  
DEMO: But you don't have truly competitive elections in Singapore. The Singa- 
pore government also controls for the possibility of "bad" rulers by numbering 
ballots, humiliating and bankrupting opposition candidates, and instilling an atmo- 
sphere of fear in the population at large. That's not what you want for China, is it? 
WANC: NO, of course not. But neither do I want to leave it all up to "the people." 
It's simply too risky in China. Most people are still uneducated peasants, and.. . . 
DEMO: [Interrupting] Now hold on a second. Peasants-or perhaps "farmers" is 
a more politically correct word-already vote in China. Surely you're familiar with 
the village democracy program, with farmers choosing among candidates competing 
for posts on village committees. Even the Communist Party endorsed this program in 
the mid-1990s, on the grounds that local leaders needed to be made more ac- 
~oun tab le .~ 'You're not against that, are you? 
WANC: NO, no, don't be silly. Of  course "farmers" should choose the leaders of 
village committees. They should have the power to remove corrupt local leaders 
from office. But do you think "farmers" are qualified to choose national political 
rulers deciding such complex matters as macroeconomic management and foreign 
policy? I'd be nervous about granting too much power to relatively uneducated 
people, and I know many "democrats" also worry about the possibility of a farmer- 
dominated l eg i ~ l a t u r e . ~~  we face are so severe-over-In China, the problems 
population, pollution, increasing economic inequality, a risk of civil war-that's it's 
just too much of a gamble to invest all our hopes in the capricious likes and dislikes 
of a largely rural population in a free-for-all political fest held every four or five 
years. 
DEMO: But what are the alternatives? 
WANC: Exactly. Remember, I don't have a quarrel with democracy per se. My  
aim is  simply to temper the democratic process with a concern for the selection of 
talented decision makers. And, to repeat, even Western societies like the United 
States do in practice place constraints on the decision-making powers of elected 
politicians. But your solutions may not be readily transferable to our country, and the 
question is how to combine democracy with a stable, legitimate, and effective system 
of rule by an intellectual elite in a Chinese context. 
[Plural Voting Schemes1 
DEMO:This reminds me of Lee Kuan Yew's proposal for a plural voting scheme. Lee, 
as you know, isn't convinced that the one-man, one-vote system is the best way to 
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select a government of the "best men." So he floated the idea of giving middle-aged 
family men two votes on the grounds that they're supposedly more likely to be 
careful, voting also for their children. Lee said that young men bent on immediate 
gratification are more likely to vote in a capricious way, not taking into account the 
interests of others, and that elderly people are also focused on short-term, supporting 
policies like free health care, which may harm the economic prospects of future 
generation^.^^ Is this what you have in mind? 
WANG: NO. I considered Lee's idea, as well as John Stuart Mill's proposal for 
granting extra votes to educated people on the grounds that they're less likely to vote 
in accordance with material interests.24 But I rejected these schemes, as well as 
other proposals for giving extra votes to certain groups of citizens. 
DEMO: Why is that? 
WANG: I concluded that plural voting schemes are simply too arbitrary. I accept 
the premise that not everyone is equally inclined to vote in a sensible manner, but 
selecting target groups of "rational" voters is a rough and unreliable procedure. And 
those denied an equal share of democratic rights are likely to perceive the denial as 
an official insult issued by public auth0rity.~5 People would object to being treated 
as unequals at the very start of the political process. [Short pause.] It boils down to 
the fact that I could never get past the question of "who decides?" If the government 
decides who gets the extra votes, people may think the government is motivated by a 
desire to select the groups most likely to perpetuate dominance of the ruling party. 
Recall what happened last year in Singapore: Lee tried to implement his proposal, 
but it was blocked after the opposition Singapore Democratic Party embarrassed the 
government with a study from a National University of Singapore sociologist-the 
poor fellow paid with his job-which showed that middle-aged family men are 
twice as likely to vote for Lee's party, relative to any other segment of the population. 
Of  course, Singapore-style clampdowns on dissenting views makes this proposal 
particularly problematic. 
DEMO: But giving people extra votes would also be problematic in a more dem- 
ocratic context. Political parties would promise special favors to groups with extra 
votes,26 and elected officials might try to award extra votes to their own con-
stituencies, regardless of merit. It would be a mistake to let politicians decide these 
matters. 
WANG: I agree. And there are no obvious alternatives to letting politicians decide 
these matters. Who would trust an "independent" body of social science experts to 
identify the groups most likely to vote for competent and public-spirited rulers? Even 
if it were feasible, who would appoint this body? 
DEMO: You won't get any objections from me. Things could get even more 
complicated. The "target group" of sensible voters may change over time, so I 
imagine this body of social science experts would have to revise the "extra-voting" 
rules at every election. 
WANG: Yes. No one could be trusted with this sort of power, in a Chinese context 
or anywhere else. So I dropped the idea of extra-voting proposals. 
458 Philosophy East & West 
[A Corporatist Assembly] 
DEMO:O.K., let's move on to your own proposal. 
WANG: We'll get there eventually. For a while, I was also tempted by Hegel's 
account of the ideal state in the Philosophy of Right. 
DEMO:YOU mean his argument for investing power in disinterested civil servants, 
chosen on the basis of competitive examination^?^^ I can see why you'd be tempted 
by Hegel's political views. 
WANG: Actually, from a Chinese perspective, there's nothing particularly original 
about Hegel's argument for an impartial civil service. I was most interested by 
Hegel's attempt to reconcile political rule by expert bureaucrats with a concern for 
representing the voices of different segments of society. He argued for a bicameral 
legislature, an upper house of the landed propertied class, and a lower house of 
corporations and professional guilds. The legislature would serve the function of 
helping the civil servants to make rational decisions by providing detailed informa- 
tion on the urgent and specialized needs of particular constituencies. He argued as 
well that the legislature should hold its deliberations in public, hence developing the 
political virtues and abilities of the legislators and educating "the masses" about the 
various ways political bodies help to promote the common good of the polity. Hegel 
recognized that individuals are now interested in the conduct of the state's affairs 
and want a voice in determining its policies, and he concluded that only an open 
and transparent assembly could instill respect for political institutions. 
DEMO: But he opposed direct suffrage! 
WANG: That's correct. Hegel worried that individuals not tied to any groups or 
organizations would, in his words, be "elemental, irrational, barbarous, and terrify- 
ing." Anticipating Tocqueville's argument on the importance of civil society for 
promoting civic virtue, Hegel argued that individuals come to take an interest in 
common enterprises and to develop a certain degree of political competence only 
by joining and participating in voluntary associations and community groups. That's 
why Hegel favored a lower house composed of corporations and professional 
guilds-whereas individuals are likely to vote with their pocketbooks, representa- 
tives of corporate bodies would in all probability display a certain amount of orga- 
nizational ability and concern for the common good. 
DEMO: It's worth keeping in mind that Hegel's scheme was implemented by 
Mussolini and his National Union of Fascists, who held that corporatism was a way 
of eliminating social conflict by integrating the people through their work groups 
into the state.28 
WANG: I think that's unfair. Hegel may not have been a democrat in the sense of 
favoring universal suffrage, but he was still a kind of liberal, concerned with articu- 
lating the social framework within which freedom can be realized.29 It's just that he 
thought the modern aspiration for freedom could best be sustained in a nondemo- 
cratic political context. 
DEMO: Fortunately history has proved him wrong. 
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WANC: I'm not so sure. Consider the Legislative Council of Hong Kong in the 
1980s and '90s, perhaps the closest approximation anywhere to Hegel's corporate 
assembly.30 De facto power in Hong Kong, it seems, was more often than not 
exercised by a group of relatively able and honest "HegelianU-or should I say 
"Confucianu?-bureaucrats in the colonial administration. But the composition of 
the Legislative Council is more relevant for our purposes. From 1844 right up to 
1 985, all members of the Council were directly appointed by the Governor. In order 
to represent more authoritatively the views of Hong Kong people, however, the 
government decided to institute elections for a number of the seats. But it disparaged 
the idea of introducing direct elections by universal suffrage on the grounds that this 
might lead to instability at a crucial time. So the government decided that a large 
number of seats should be allocated to functional constituencies based on various 
interest groups, a system that was kept in place following the handover to China.31 
Doctors and dentists had one seat, as did teachers, lawyers, engineers, and 
accountants. The largest chunk of functional constituency seats went to business 
interests, such as the Chinese Manufacturer's Association, the Chinese Gold and 
Silver Exchange, and the Hong Kong Tourist Association. Altogether twenty-one out 
of sixty seats were allocated to functional constituencies, a number that increased to 
thirty in the 1995 and 1998 elections. As far as I know, this was a truly unique 
"Hegelian" legislative assembly-in no other country at the time was the largest 
block of seats in a house of government assigned to business groups and professional 
organization^.^^ 
DEMO: But this wasn't a stable and legitimate political arrangement. The Hong 
Kong people wanted the right to vote! 
WANC: That's not immediately obvious. When they were given the opportunity 
to exercise the right to vote for a limited number of seats in 1991 and 1995, only 30 
percent or so bothered turning out for the elections. 
DEMO: But in 1998 that number increased to over 50 percent. And voter turnout 
would have been even higher if people had actually been voting for their commu- 
nity's most important decision makers. Remember, in Hong Kong, the unelected 
members of the executive made policy, and elected members of the legislature 
functioned more as opposition critics than as legislators. 
WANG: I actually agree with you. Iwas playing the role of-how do you say it?- 
"devil's advocate". . . . 
DEMO:Yes. This term comes from an established practice of the Catholic Church. 
At the canonization of a saint, the Church appoints and listens carefully to a "devil's 
advocate." The idea is that even the holiest of men can't be admitted to post- 
humous honors until all that the devil could say against him is known, weighed, and 
refuted. 
WANC: I remember reading about that in John Stuart Mill's ~ o r k . 3 ~  The Con- 
fucian equivalent is the "Censor," who was obligated to protest against bad officials 
and harmful policies. It was a risky job, and some high-minded Confucian officials 
paid with their lives.34 [Short pause.] In any case, my point is that the right to vote, 
for whatever reason, seems to have emerged as an ineliminable symbol of political 
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recognition for citizens in the modern world. No polity that denies the right to vote, I 
think, can ever hope to achieve a stable and legitimate political system. In that 
sense, Hegel was quite mistaken when he predicted that given the opportunity to 
participate in mass elections, with individual votes having little effect, citizens would 
inevitably become indifferent and fail to make use of the vote. 
DEMO: Let me support that with the observation that political apathy tends to be 
even higher in political regimes like Singapore, which place substantial constraints 
on the electoral process.35 [Short pause.] But I'm a little confused. It seems that you 
do not, after all, endorse Hegel's proposal for a corporatist legislative assembly. 
WANG: NO, definitely not. Hong Kong tried to make do without a fully elected 
assembly, but it never did achieve much legitimacy among ordinary citizens, who 
placed more value on universal suffrage. Denying most people the right to vote, in 
other words, just didn't work. The second problem with Hegel's proposal can also 
be vividly illustrated with the Hong Kong case. The small size of most functional 
constituencies meant that it was possible for the voters to keep a close watch on 
what their representative was doing, and to instruct him on what he should say and 
how he should vote. In one case, the Chairman of the Hong Kong General Chamber 
of Commerce publicly rebuked its representative4 believe McGregor was his 
name-for voicing liberal views in the Legislative Council that didn't have the 
Chamber's support.36 It was the same old story after the handover: professionals 
asked their representatives to protect their own interests in making a living rather 
than serving the community as a whole.37 In short, most functional constituency 
representatives were serving the narrow concerns of the richest and most privileged 
sectors of the community. You can imagine the effect this had on the legitimacy of 
the functional constituency system in the polity at large. 
DEMO: Mmm. . . . Just as Hegel may have underestimated the importance of the 
right to vote for ordinary citizens in modern societies, so he seems to have over- 
estimated the capacity of "corporate" representatives to function as more than ser- 
vants of powerful interest groups. 
[A Parliament of Scholar-Officials] 
WANG: Exactly. So I had to consider other options for tempering democracy with a 
concern for institutionalizing rule by an intellectual elite in China. I was most 
inspired by Huang Zongxi's proposals for political reform. Huang was a radical 
seventeenth-century Confucian critic of the Chinese dynastic system.. . . 
DEMO: [Interrupting] Did you say Confucian critic of the Chinese dynastic sys- 
tem? I was under the impression that Confucian mandarins were loyal supporters of 
imperial power. Isn't there something in the Analects about learning the virtue of 
obedience in the family in order to instill habits of obedience to the ruler? 
WANG:I think you're referring to the following passage: 
Master Yu said, Those who in private life behave well towards their parents and elder 
brothers, in public life seldom show a disposition to resist the authority of their superiors. 
And as for such men starting a revolution, no instance of it has ever occurred. It is upon 
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the trunk that a gentleman works. When that is firmly set up, the Way grows. And surely 
proper behavior towards parents and elder brothers i s  the trunk of Goodness? (1 :2 )  
The point here is to stress that the family is the main educative institution for learning 
morality. Morality, however, doesn't mean blind obedience-even in the context of 
the family; later in the Analects Confucius says "In serving your father and mother 
you ought to dissuade them from doing wrong in the gentlest way" (4 :1 SO the 
family may be an important institution for instilling the virtue of respect for legitimate 
authority, but even filial sons have an obligation to persuade parents to refrain from 
~ rongdo i ng .~g  
DEMO: I must say I'm quite impressed. You seem to have memorized the whole 
of the Analects. 
WANG: Well, there's been somewhat of a resurgence of tradition lately, and 
you'd be surprised just how many educated Chinese can recite passages from 
"sacred" texts. Besides, the Analects i s  only one hundred pages or so; it's not like the 
Bible. 
DEMO:[Smiles] Is pithiness a Confucian virtue? 
WANG: Yes, actually. There's a strong bias in Confucianism against eloquence 
and clever argumentation not matched by the required actions. As Confucius put it, 
"A gentleman covets the reputation of being slow in word but prompt in deed" 
(4 :24; see also 14 :29). [Short pause.] In any case, I was hoping to return to the 
doubts you expressed about the critical potential of Confucianism. Remember that 
Mencius-Confucius' most famous follower-went so far as to justify the assassina- 
tion of rulers who fail to serve the people's interests.40 
DEMO: But you seem to be drawing only on the "liberal" parts of the Confucian 
tradition, leaving out the rest. Unfortunately, "actually existing" Confucianism 
tended to draw more on the part that supported the authoritarian, hierarchical status 
WANG: It's not that simple. The critical potential of Confucianism also influenced 
the practice. In fact, Confucianism was challenged by its rivals precisely on the 
grounds that Confucian morality fails to instill political obedience. Han Fei Tzu, for 
example, repeatedly attacked Confucian "wandering scholars" (sec. 49)42 for sowing 
a critical attitude vis-2-vis the laws of the land. 
DEMO: Say that again? 
WANG: I was referring to Han Fei Tzu, the major synthesizer of Legalist thought. 
Han Fei was a profoundly cynical proponent of realpolitik-Machiavelli was a naive 
idealist in comparison. He wrote a political handbook for rulers, arguing that state 
power can be strengthened by means of harsh laws and punishments. His aim was 
nothing less than total state control, and he stressed that moral considerations should 
not get in the way. Not surprisingly, rulers were quite receptive to this sort of advice, 
starting with the ruthless King of Ch'in, who ascended to the throne in 246 B.C. and 
drew on Han Fei's advice to conquer and rule all of China under the title of First 
Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty. [Short pause.] In any case, Han Fei had nothing but 
contempt for Confucian morality. He was understandably horrified, for example, by 
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the famous Confucian argument that the requirements of filial piety justify breaking 
the law. 
DEMO: Did Confucius really say that? 
WANG: Yes. Let me quote the Analects once again: 
The "Duke" of She addressed Confucius saying, In my country there was a man called 
Upright Kung. His father appropriated a sheep, and Kung bore witness against him. 
Confucius said, In my country the upright men are of quite another sort. A father will 
screen his son, and a son his father-which incidentally does involve a sort of upright- 
ness. (13 : 18) 
Han Fei recounted this episode, and his view was, of course, quite unfavorable. He 
added another story-probably a fabrication-about Confucius rewarding a man for 
running away from battle in order to care for an aged father, with the result that the 
people thought nothing of surrendering or deserting (sec. 49). The "family over 
state" principle, in Han Fei's view, is incompatible with successful warfare, and 
more generally Han Fei urged governments not to promote Confucian values. 
DEMO: I suspect that Han Fei may have been agonizing over a nonissue. No 
government would promote a moral system that justifies breaking the law! 
WANG: You'd be surprised. Filial piety as a preeminent value was in fact 
enshrined by law in Imperial China. Already in Han times people were permitted to 
conceal the crimes of close relatives without legal penalty, and they weren't com-
pelled to testify in court against family members.43 In the Ching dynasty, a son who 
brought an accusation of parental wrongdoing before the authorities was subject to 
strangulation if the accusation was false, and even if it was true the son was pun- 
ished with three years of penal servitude plus one hundred blows of the heavy 
bamboo.44 Scolding one's parent or grandparent was punishable by death.45 
DEMO: [Stunned] Really! 
WANG: Yes. So remember, my point is to stress that realpolitik types in Imperial 
China criticized Confucianism for encouraging disobedience and fostering a critical 
perspective vis-A-vis the state. Far from justifying blind adherence to the political 
status quo, Confucian values often provided the intellectual resources for social 
DEMO: My  perception of Confucianism must have been influenced by Lee Kuan 
Yew, who appeals to Confucianism to buttress authoritarian rule. 
WANG: It's a sad fact of the real political world that rulers often distort ideas to 
suit their own narrow political agendas. No doubt Marx as well would also have 
been horrified by what people did in his name. [Shortpause.] In any case, perhaps I 
should return to that seventeenth-century Confucian scholar Huang Zongxi. Huang's 
book Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince is a powerful Confucian critique of 
despotism. Let me try to remember a relevant passage. [Short pause.] Well, in the 
very first chapter Huang says: "In ancient times all-under-Heaven were considered 
the master, and the prince was the tenant. The prince spent his whole life working 
for all-under-Heaven. Now the prince is the master, and all-under-Heaven are ten- 
ants. That no one can find peace and happiness anywhere is all on account of the 
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prince."47 This was written around the time of the collapse of the Ming dynasty. 
Huang was resisting the conquest of China by the Manchus, who went on to found 
the Qing dynasty. 
DEMO:And how did the new Manchu emperor react to this point of view? 
WANG: Huang wasn't so foolish as to publicize his ideas. Judging by his scornful 
characterization of "actually existing" dynastic rule, it's unlikely that Huang was 
actually addressing the emperor of his day.48 Huang's hope, it seems, was that a 
future ruler inclined toward benevolence would seize his ideas to build what we 
might term a just political order. 
DEMO:SO how did the book get transmitted to future generations? 
WANG: Well, initially it was distributed to a few colleagues and students. His 
book was then circulated "samizdatrr-pardon the anachronistic language-for two 
and a half centuries, finally seeing the light of day in the latter part of the Qing 
period, with the dynasty in disarray. Huang came to be acclaimed by late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century reformers as an early champion of native Chinese 
"democratic" ideas.49 For example, Liang Qichao-China's most famous writer in 
the early twentieth century-reprinted Huang's book to provide more ammunition 
for political reform.50 
DEMO: Did Huang provide any concrete alternative to dynastic power, or was he 
merely criticizing the status quo? 
WANG: That's what's interesting. Unlike most Confucians, he went beyond 
merely affirming the need for a virtuous ruler of exemplary character, arguing for 
specific laws and institutions designed to curb imperial power. Huang favored 
establishing a strong prime minister, so as to balance the power of the emperor 
["Establishing a Prime Minister"]. If the aim is serving the people, according to 
Huang, then the role of ministers should be strengthened, and the emperor should 
welcome criticism from ministers who point to the plight of the people ["On Minis- 
tership"]. And I want you to pay special attention to his proposal for strengthening 
the political role of the schools for the training of Confucian scholar-officials. 
Schools of all levels, in Huang's view, should serve as forums for open public dis- 
cussion. He noted that during the Eastern Han, A.D. 25-220, scholars at the Imperial 
College-the top school for the training of scholar-officials-engaged in outspoken 
discussion of important issues without fear of those in power, and the highest offi- 
cials were anxious to avoid their censure. Moreover, Huang proposed that the rector 
of the Imperial College, to be chosen from among the great scholars of the day, 
should be equal in importance to the prime minister, and that once a month the 
emperor should visit the Imperial College, along with the prime minister and some 
other ministers. The emperor was to sit among the ranks of the students while the 
rector questioned him on the administration of the country ["Schools"]. 
DEMO: It sounds like "question time" in Parliament! 
WANG: [Excited] Exactly! He wanted rulers to be held accountable to a "Parlia- 
ment of scholar^"!^' 
DEMO: [Pause] Now hold on a second. Is that what you're proposing for China? A 
Parliament of Scholars? How would you choose the scholars? 
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WANG: The standard Confucian practice is to select scholar-officials on the basis 
of fair and open competitive examinations. 
DEMO: Are Confucian examinations really appropriate for modern China? Cor- 
rect me if I'm wrong, but examinations in Imperial China tested the memorization of 
the Confucian classics, and I doubt that's a sound basis for selecting a political ruling 
class in the contemporary era. 
WANG: Once again, Huang Zongxi's proposals for reform are relevant. Huang 
condemned the examinations of his day for rewarding superficiality and plagiarism, 
and thus failing to identify men of "real talent." He didn't oppose testing knowledge 
of the classics and subsequent commentaries, but he emphasized that candidates 
must also offer their own interpretation of a question. To use Huang's own words-l 
think I can get this right.. . :  "After listing one by one what is said by the various Han 
and Sung scholars, the candidate should conclude with his own opinion, there being 
no necessity for blind acceptance of one authority's word" ["The Selection of 
Scholar-Officials, Part I"]. The examinations should test for both the capacity to store 
information and the capacity for independent thought. 
DEMO: Interesting. But let me ask you a question: what happened to democracy? 
If rulers are selected on the basis of competitive examinations rather than elections, 
how do "the people" fit in? How can ordinary people express their political will in 
your scheme, and how can they have control over the conduct of government? 
WANG: That's precisely the problem with Huang Z ~ n g x i , ~ ~  and with Confucian- 
ism more generally. The stress is on politics for the people, but there's not much on 
politics by the people.53 
DEMO: [Frustrated] Now you've really lost me. You keep on switching back and 
forth. You seem tempted by the J .  S. Mill/Lee Kuan Yew proposal for granting extra 
votes to more sensible and public-spirited voters, but then you admit that selecting 
the relevant target group can be an arbitrary process subject to political manipula- 
tion. You seem tempted by Hegel's idea of a legislature composed of representatives 
from community groups, but then you admit that in all likelihood this arrangement 
will unfairly benefit rich and powerful sectors, as it did in Hong Kong. You seem 
tempted by Huang Zongxi's proposal for a parliament of scholar-officials selected on 
the basis of competitive examinations, but then you admit that this political system 
deprives the people of any voice in politics. Sometimes you're a democrat, some- 
times you're a Confucian. You want rulers of talent and character, but only in an 
overall democratic context. Can you have it both ways? 
WANG: I guess you want to hear my own proposal. 
DEMO:Yes! You've kept me waiting long enough. 
SCENE Ill. The Proposal 
WANG: Here it is. As I mentioned, the idea hit me one day in the Kentucky Fried 
Chicken outlet at Tiananmen Square. I was thinking to myself, if capitalism and 
communism can coexist in the economic realm, then why not democracy and 
Confucianism in the political realm? And then, all of a sudden, it seemed so obvious, 
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and I must admit this is the first time in my life that a sudden illumination still 
seemed quite persuasive several months after the fact. The solution: a bicameral 
legislature, with a democratically elected lower house and an upper house com- 
posed of representatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations. I call the 
upper house the "House of Scholars." 
DEMO: Mmm . . . interesting.. . . 
[Selection Procedures] 
[At this point a Beijing University graduate student named LI XUEDONG enters PROFES-
SORWANG'S office and stops, momentarily surprised to see DEMO.] 
WANG: Let me do the introductions. This is Mr. Demo, an American friend who 
works with the National Council for Democracy, and [to DEMO]this is Li Xuedong, a 
doctoral student doing a thesis on Dzhaparidze's system of bimodel logic. [DEMO 
and LI XUEDONGshake hands.] 
LI: Pleased to meet you. Is Professor Wang explaining his proposal for "democ- 
racy with Chinese characteristics"? 

DEMO: Yes, what's your view? 

LI: [Turning red] Well, you know, we never criticize our professors in China. 
WANG: Please, Xuedong, tell Mr. Demo what you think. 
LI: I generally support this proposal. My only concern is Professor Wang's idea 
that representatives of the House of Scholars be selected on the basis of competitive 
examinations. Here at Beijing University-the most prestigious university in China 
-many of our top undergraduates arrive fresh from the countryside. I'm not saying 
they're not smart, but they're good primarily at memorizing answers for the univer- 
sity entrance exams, and often they're not very sophisticated in other respects. Some 
of them change once they stay in Beijing for a few years, but I'd be worried about 
giving political power to narrow-minded young men and women. 
DEMO: [Smiles.] You, I presume, are not from the countryside. 
LI: I'm from Shanghai, which helps a bit. 
WANG: Xuedong, I share your concern about rewarding young persons "fresh 
from the countryside." But more generally, I'd worry about being governed by overly 
clever young people no matter where they're from-imagine a House of Scholars 
full of arrogant and hot-headed twenty-year -o ld~!~~ So I'd impose an age minimum 
for the examinations of, say, thirty-five or forty years. 
DEMO: Perhaps I should also step in to defend the proposal. Professor Wang was 
telling me that he endorses Huang Zongxi's idea for examinations that test for both 
memorization and independent thought. 
WANG: That's correct. I favor exams with an essay component, and I'd award 
high grades to those who can provide innovative yet plausible solutions to the 
questions we ask them. I'd also include one or two essay questions on ethics, to help 
filter out the brilliant but morally insensitive technocrats. 
LI: Professor Wang, I don't want to criticize your proposal, but it may not be easy 
to test for the kinds of "moral" qualities you're looking for. 
466 Philosophy East & West 
WANG: It's not easy, but we have to try. We're not just looking for professional 
competence, or the ability to implement goals handed down by others. We want 
people who can reflect upon the deeper purposes of public policies and who give 
attention to the claims, real and potential, of those who might be affected by such 
policies. Ideally, of course, we'd select people with a certain amount of civic virtue. 
LI: But it's difficult to test for those qualities in an exam. For example, people can 
provide you with "moral" answers, but it doesn't mean they're sincerely held or that 
decision makers would use them in actual situations. 
WANG: Look, no system is perfect. At the very least, we could filter out morally 
obtuse people-for example, those who aren't even aware of the need to secure 
basic human rights. As well, we could eliminate political demagogues by asking 
questions that require people to look at both sides of controversial i ssue~~~-most  
demagogues seem congenitally unable to articulate in a plausible way the kinds of 
arguments they hope to refute. In that sense, it's safer to rely on exams than on the 
democratic process. And if we're lucky, we might get some really good ones. 
LI:But you can't guarantee that you'd come up with the most "moral" candidates. 
WANG: [Raises voice] Of course there's no guarantee! This is politics, not phi- 
losophy. It's a question of how this system compares to the feasible alternatives; 
we're not searching for ironclad proofs. If you want to criticize my proposal, you 
have to suggest another method that's more likely to produce talented and public- 
spirited decision makers.56 
LI: [Somewhat taken aback] Professor Wang, I guess I'm not against exams per 
se, it's just my concern that they should be as objective as possible. If you allow for 
"subjective factors" to intervene-testing for civic virtue and so on-the tests can be 
easily abused, with high grades being awarded on the basis of guanxi rather than 
merit. At least the results of our multiple-choice university entrance exams can't be 
skewed by personal favoritism. 
WANG: I appreciate your point. At the first stage of the examination process, for 
reasons of efficiency I'd stick to multiple-choice exams. But after that, I think it's 
essential to include an essay component. I agree with you that the selection process 
must be seen as scrupulously fair and impartial-otherwise people won't accept the 
legitimacy of the House of Scholars. This isn't an insurmountable obstacle, however. 
The essay questions can be graded "blind," say, by a committee of experts in the 
field who are given scripts with numbers rather than names. 
DEMO: Pardon the interruption, but wouldn't you want to interview the candi- 
dates as well? It seems to me that they should be tested for their ability to respond to 
oral questions. Some people are good at written exams, but they can't express 
themselves well or participate intelligently in a conversation with real-life individ- 
uals. This doesn't matter much if one is an academic, but it would be a serious 
weakness in a political ruler. And once you allow for oral interviews, you're back to 
Xuedong's point about potential bias in the selection process. 
WANG: I agree about the need for oral interviews, but there's a neat solution to 
the problem of bias in oral interviews. Candidates can be interviewed behind 
screens, which is how musical examinations are sometimes administered. 
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DEMO: But screens can't block out everything. For example, it would still be 
possible to identify the sex of the applicant. That might be a problem, as the female 
applicants could find themselves at a disadvantage. After all, only males took the 
civil service examinations in the past, and some people might want to maintain the 
"tradition" of selecting male decision makers. 
WANG: Well, that's the past. East Asian countries today don't bar females from 
civil service examinations, and that's what I'd want for China. In fact, one of the 
virtues of examinations is that they're likely to increase the proportion of female de- 
cision makers. You might even get 50 percent, which is  better than the Scandinavian 
countries! And no need to rely on an artificial and unmeritocratic quota system. 
DEMO: YOU didn't answer my point. If you allow for oral examinations, "infor- 
mal" discrimination might take place at that stage. 
WANG: Perhaps voices can be processed through a kind of synthesizer that masks 
the sex of the respondent. Or else they can be typed on a computer screen. I'm sure 
there's a technical solution to this problem. 
LI: Professor Li, I have another problem with "blind" examinations. If we can't 
actually see the respondents, it means a person with sanjiaoyan might get through. 
Who would trust a ruler with sanjiaoyan? 
DEMO: [Interjecting] I must admit, I do not quite understand. 
WANG: [Sighs] Ai ya, this is  quite complicated. You see, Westerners distinguish 
between different eye colors-women look with envy upon Elizabeth Taylor's 
beautiful violet eyes; Frank Sinatra's pale blue eyes made him handsome; and so 
on. But Chinese people all have brown eyes, so we hardly notice eye colors, dis- 
tinguishing instead between different eye shapes. The most common distinction is  of 
course between "single" and "double" eyelids. Few Westerners notice the differ- 
ence, even after being told of its relevance for Chinese people-perhaps because 
nearly all of you have double eyelids-but in China it's quite important to have 
"double" eyelids, which make the eyes look bigger and supposedly more attractive. 
In fact, the most common form of plastic surgery in China-and in other East Asian 
countries, such as Korea and Japan-is a slice above the eye to add a second eyelid. 
DEMO: [With a slight twitch] Really? 
WANG: It's a painless operation, far less problematic than what you call "nose 
jobs," not to mention the infamous silicone "treatment" debacle. In any case, what's 
interesting is  that a rich and subtle vocabulary has evolved in Chinese to describe 
different eye shapes. There's a prejudice in Chinese society against "doujiyan," or 
"fighting-rooster eyes," but on the other hand "xingrenyan," or "almond-shaped 
eyes," are widely admired. I suspect that most Westerners wouldn't even notice the 
difference. 
DEMO: This is interesting, but I'm not too sure how the topic of eye shapes fits 
into our discussion on "democracy with Chinese characteristics." 
WANG: I was getting to that. It's not just that we've developed an aesthetic hier- 
archy of eye shapes. Sometimes eye shapes are said to express certain personality 
traits as well. For example, people with "sanjiaoyan," or triangular "three-angle" 
eyes, are said to be untrustworthy. That's what was worrying Xuedong-my proposal 
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for "blind" grading wouldn't be able to filter out people with "sanjiaoyan," and he 
couldn't imagine that anyone would trust a ruler with this sort of eye shape. 
LI: Thank you, Professor Wang. I should have made myself more clear. 
WANG: But let me add that I wouldn't want to modify my proposal to accom- 
modate this cultural value. On the contrary, I think we should challenge this absurd 
tendency to rank people on the basis of eye shapes, in the same way that we chal- 
lenge other harmful traditional values and practices such as nepotism, the preference 
for siring male children, and the historical practice of excluding women from entry 
into public service. At least from a political standpoint, it's important to distinguish 
between desirable and undesirable cultural traits. The government should try to 
promote only those cultural values appropriate for the modern era, like the tradition 
of respect for rule by an intellectual elite. 
LI: [Embarrassed] You're right, Professor Wang. I'm not an expert in the field of 
political philosophy, and I should have deferred to your point of view. 
WANG: NO need to be so modest, Xuedong. I may face these questions tomorrow 
at the constitutional convention, and it's important to be prepared with persuasive 
answers. 
LI: If you'll excuse me, I must return to my studies. Nice meeting you Mr. Demo. 
[Li exits.] 
DEMO: Perhaps I can add that American political culture is also subject to harm- 
ful prejudices. If FDR had run for president in the age of television, voters would 
have been aware of his physical disability, and he may have had difficulty getting 
elected. Many people still seem to judge political rulers on the basis of irrelevant 
physical characteristics. 
WANG: Hence the need for "blind" evaluation of candidates for the House of 
Scholars. 
DEMO: Let me return to the question of the content of the examinations. Even if 
your written examinations test for memorization, independent thought, ethics, and 
the ability to make good points in an actual conversation, it may still be that you're 
failing to test for the quality that really matters, that is, the capacity to deal with the 
problems of government. Don't you think it's also important to test for the ability to 
deal with actual political problems? 
WANG: Yes, of course. Confucius himself was quite concerned with the need to 
identify those with know-how. He said, "A man may be able to recite the three 
hundred Songs; but if, when given a post in the government, he cannot turn his 
merits to account, or, when sent on a mission to far parts, he cannot answer partic- 
ular questions, however extensive his knowledge may be, of what use is  it to him?" 
[Analects 13.51. In the same vein, our exams could include questions covering a 
wide range of actual political problems. We could ask questions about pressing 
issues in domestic and foreign policy, for example. 
DEMO: But you'd only succeed at identifying talented generalists. And this poses 
certain problems. The Federal Reserve Bank, for example, is  composed mainly of 
professional economists. More generally, conceptions of meritocracy have changed 
since the days of Confucius. Under conditions of modern knowledge, with its vastly 
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more specialized character, it's best to identify and appoint highly trained specialists 
to work on policies in their particular field. Your "Confucian" exams would be quite 
useless for this purpose. 
WANG: I'm not sure about that. Knowledge may be more specialized, but many 
different types of knowledge are relevant for political decisions. If anything, things 
are becoming more interconnected. For example, foreign policy is  being driven by 
economic forces more than ever before: during the Asian economic crisis, we saw 
more of Robert Rubin than Madeleine Albright. On  the other hand, it's difficult to 
make sense of economics without a good grasp of the underlying political forces: the 
World Bank was bullish about the Indonesian economy until the very end because 
it didn't factor in political issues like resentment against the Suharto clan or the 
concentration of economic wealth in the hands of the Chinese minority. So I don't 
think we'd want "highly trained specialists" deciding things at the very highest levels 
of government. What we're looking for are men and women of talent and integrity. 
They must be learned and sensitive to ethical considerations, as well as intellectually 
agile, in the sense of being able to take a "bird's-eye view" and adapt quickly to 
new situations in a rapidly changing modern world. Once these people are identi- 
fied, it's my firm belief that they can learn to exercise wise and prudent political 
judgment. 
DEMO: But this requires a veritable leap of faith! 
WANG: I'd like to point out that what you call a "leap of faith" is  already the 
practice in much of East Asia, and the results are quite positive overall. In Singapore, 
the ruling PAP favors top civil servants and ministers who have a "helicopter view," 
meaning that they can detach themselves from nitty-gritty details to consider matters 
as a whole, put issues in their overall social and political context, and anticipate the 
likely impact of a changing environment. Often these people have no political or 
technical background, but here, too, they learn to apply their wisdom to whatever 
problem comes up. In Hong Kong, Administrative Grade Officers-the elite unit at 
the apex of the civil service pyramid-are generalists; they change departments 
every five years or so. The assumption is that they need to be broad-minded and 
wide-ranging, spotting changing trends in different areas and adapting to new sit- 
uations. And in Japan-like I said-the top graduates from Tokyo University's law 
faculty, chosen on the basis of competitive examinations, are almost automatically 
given important posts in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International 
Affairs. It's simply assumed that the top academic achievers wil l learn "on the job." 
DEMO:[Interrupting]But that "assumption" has run into problems of late. Japa- 
nese-style meritocratically chosen bureaucrats may have been an asset in the early 
stages of development, but they've failed quite spectacularly to provide creative 
solutions to the problems of an advanced economy. Just about everyone agrees 
there's a need for more democracy and less bureaucracy in Japan. 
WANG: First of all, China is still a relatively undeveloped country, so that objec- 
tion isn't relevant for China's current situation. More importantly, I'm not saying that 
China should copy every aspect of the Japanese model of selecting political man- 
agers. The idea is to take what has worked and avoid the rest. 
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DEMO: But you're not answering my point. Even in a relatively undeveloped 
economy, it's better to rely on specialists than generalists. China's central bank, for 
example, should appoint trained economists, not generalists from the House of 
Scholars. 
WANG: Look, I'm not arguing against the need for expertise. Of  course decision 
makers need to rely on the views of experts, but .they often need to rely on the views 
of different experts looking at different sides of public policy questions. Moreover, 
scientific "evidence" on important public policy issues is rarely conclusive. More 
often than not, it leaves lots of room for interpretation and judgment calls, and that's 
where we want decision makers of talent and integrity to come in.57 Even the Fed- 
eral Reserve Bank might be better off if it included more non-economists. After all, 
the Fed is  often accused of favoring the interests of Wall Street over Main Street, and 
perhaps "generalists" could make a difference. 
DEMO: [Pause] Maybe you're right. And come to think of it, the use of the 
examination system to select "political" generalists is not unique to East Asia. In 
France, students compete for entry to the Ecole Nationale dlAdministration, and 
successful graduates are subsequently empowered to make decisions in the political 
and business worlds, often moving back and forth between the private and public 
sectors. In the U.S., however, it's usually the private sector that draws on academi- 
cally successful individuals with the ability to move from one domain to another and 
to develop the required skills "on the job." The leading business consultancy firm, 
McKenzie and Co., offers jobs to all Rhodes scholars who apply, no experience 
necessary. Investment banks like Goldman Sachs hire Ph.D.s from top universities in 
fields completely unrelated to banking-once again on the assumption that talent is 
transferable from one domain to another. 
WANG: Exactly. So why shouldn't governments do the same? It would benefit 
society as a whole if the brightest minds were entrusted with the task of devising 
policies for the common good, rather than promoting the good of particular com- 
mercial enterprises. Those who succeed at rigorous and wide-ranging competitive 
examinations should be given the opportunity to work for the political community. 
DEMO: There's another issue we need to discuss. Wouldn't you be worried about 
empowering people without any political experience? 
WANG: I'm not saying they should immediately be given political power. Correct 
me if I'm wrong, but business consultants and brokers are usually trained for a year 
or so before they're given the power to make important decisions. I'd do the same 
with the House of Scholars. Once representatives are selected, they can choose an 
area of specialization (the top candidates get first choice) like economic policy or 
foreign affairs, and then they can work under the guidance of the previous batch of 
scholars for a transition period of a year or two. That should be enough time to get 
them to the point where they could make informed judgments aided by experts. 
DEMO:Well, I hope you're right. But a lot seems to turn on untested hypotheses. 
WANG: It's not completely untested. To repeat, this is already the practice in 
successful East Asian countries. However, what's distinctive-or perhaps I should 
say "superioru-about my proposal is  that it would institutionalize the method of 
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selection for political rulers, unlike the case of Japan, where de facto rulers are 
chosen on the basis of an informal process. And unlike "Japanese-style" competitive 
examinations, which are frequently criticized for placing too much weight on 
memorization and rewarding those who show an excessive tendency toward con- 
f ~ r m i t y , ~ ~our exams would also test for independent thought and ethics. Moreover, 
the exercise of political power would be more transparent, compared once again 
with Japan, where top bureaucrats wield power in mysterious ways hidden behind 
the faqade of democratically elected politicians. I expect that political deliberations 
in the House of Scholars, with the exception of debates concerning national security, 
would be televised and transmitted directly to the public. 
[The Problem of Corruption] 
DEMO: Even more important than ensuring transparency, however, is the question of 
accountability. And how can the representatives of the House of Scholars be held 
accountable if they're not subject to the electoral process? If they're given lifetime 
tenure, they may become arrogant, insensitive, and corrupt. 
WANG: Not necessarily. Nonelected judges in the U.S. Supreme Court are given 
lifetime tenure, yet the Supreme Court is perhaps the least corrupt and most widely 
respected institution in the American political system. 
DEMO: But you're proposing to give "scholar-officials" real power in the sense 
of the right to formulate their own policies, not just the power to enforce the 
Constitution. 
WANG: You're right. Judges, at least in theory, have less room to maneuver than 
political decision makers, and it may be particularly important to institutionalize a 
check on the irresponsible behavior of the latter. But the electoral process is only one 
way of curbing power; setting term limits is another. In my view, "scholar-officials" 
shouldn't be given lifetime tenure, but on the other hand they must be given enough 
time to learn about politics and work for the long-term good. A constitutionally 
enshrined term limit of, say, seven or eight years seems about right. 
DEMO: But how can you guarantee that "scholar-officials" would work for the 
common good, as opposed, say, to abusing their power for the sake of personal 
enrichment? If they know they'll be out of a job in seven or eight years time, they 
may use their period of tenure to plunder the treasury. 
WANG: I am assuming, of course, that a free press will do its best to investigate 
and publicize incidents of corruption. Equally important, scholar-officials should be 
paid handsome salaries to reduce the incentive for corruption. Singapore pays the 
world's highest salaries to its top politicians and civil servants, and the result is an 
enviably low level of corruption. 
DEMO: But civil servants in Singapore have a lifelong career path. What would 
deputies from the House of Scholars do when they retire? If they retire at the age of, 
say, fifty, they may turn into behind-the-scenes power brokers with the ability to 
deliver access in exchange for cash. 
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WANG: Perhaps we can move the minimum age for deputies by five or ten years, 
so that a stint in the House of Scholars could be seen as the final stage in one's 
And I assume we'd pay them enough so that they wouldn't need more 
money after they retire. Also, I'd like to point out that this problem isn't unique to the 
House of Scholars: it's also a problem of how to prevent corruption and "back-door 
influence" when elected politicians retire. I presume we'd use the same methods to 
prevent corruption, such as constraints on lobbying for interest groups that one dealt 
with as a politician. Actually, I'd worry less about deputies from the House of 
Scholars: the fact that they're chosen by exams and change often should make them 
more immune to ongoing connections with their former colleagues. 
DEMO:YOU still seem to be placing a lot of faith in these "scholar-officials." 
WANG: I don't think we should depend entirely on their honesty. I'd favor using 
"the stick" as well as "the carrot." Singapore, for example, imposes stiff penalties 
for corrupt behavior. I'm also tempted by the Republic of Venice's anticorruption 
strategy. That Republic, as you may know, endured for over eight centuries in the 
last millennium. The regime provided peace and prosperity to its citizens, had an 
excellent legal system, possessed an elaborate and closely observed constitution, 
and yet from the year 1300 onward it was legally governed by only 2 percent of its 
p o p~ l a t i o n . ~ ~So how, you may ask, did the Republic of Venice ensure that its rulers 
resisted the temptation for personal enrichment? An audit was performed at the end 
of their tenure, and if a financial discrepancy was discovered the rulers' children 
were penal i~ed.~'  
DEMO:The ruler's children? But what if the children were innocent? 
WANG: They rarely were, and the same is true in China. The sons and daughters 
of government officials are notoriously corrupt, more often than not relying on their 
family's political connections to strike favorable deals of dubious legality. No great 
harm would be done by penalizing the children. On the contrary, this "Venetian" 
method may help to secure the honesty of officials. It may also be worth penalizing 
government officials for the misdeeds of their children so that public servants have 
an incentive to monitor the dealings of family members. 
DEMO:But how can you suggest penalizing some people for the actions of others? 
WANG: This may be difficult to understand. You see, the Chinese conception of 
the self is quite different from the typical Western view. In the West, "the buck 
stops" at the individual. The individual is  responsible for his or her own "chosen" 
behavior, no more and no less. In China, by contrast, the family is typically viewed 
as an indissoluble organism linking ancestors and descendants into a single unit. So 
it's seen as quite normal for family members to be treated less as individuals than as 
outcomes of family and clan lineage, and thus be held responsible for the misdeeds 
of close relatives. No doubt family-based punishment can be cruel. In the dynastic 
period whole families were executed for the crimes of one member, and torture and 
execution included the slicing of bodies into tiny pieces and the public exposure of 
offenders' heads-punishments meant not to maximize pain but rather to destroy the 
future lives of offenders and hence end family lines. Other punishments, however, 
Daniel A. Bell 473 
seem positively humane. Inspired by the best of Confucian values, some laws 
allowed for family members to stay in prison to care for sick relatives, and families 
could choose to rotate sentences among themselves, rather than impose the burden 
of imprisonment all upon one individual.62 
DEMO: But how much of this is still relevant in the contemporary era? 
WANG: I'm not saying that we should try to re-implement every one of these 
practices in today's society. The value of family-based responsibility, however, is still 
very much with us in the Chinese world. One of the most painful aspects of our 
experience with "communism" is that people were frequently punished for the 
"counterrevoI~tionary'~acts of family members. Some of my friends were persecuted 
simply on the grounds that distant relatives had "bourgeois" backgrounds. And let's 
not mention the distasteful practice of charging families for the cost of bullets used to 
execute their relatives. 
DEMO: AS you say, these were "painful" experiences. So doesn't it follow that 
contemporary Chinese should challenge, rather than affirm, the traditional value of 
fami ly-based punishment? 
WANG: Yes, but my point is that the conception of the family as a single unit of 
responsibility can also serve to justify certain policies designed to address contem- 
porary problems. You're familiar, for example, with China's overpopulation crisis. 
The Communists tried to improve the situation by implementing a one-child-
per-family pol icy, which in practice meant that second children faced limited 
educational opportunities compared to firstborns. One might say that they were 
"punished" for the misdeeds of their parents. This might seem unjust given Western 
conceptions of individual responsibility, but most Chinese-or in any case, most 
urban intellectuals63-support the one-child-per-family policy, as well as its publicly 
affirmed practical consequences. 
DEMO: Come to think of it, the value of family-based responsibility also plays a 
role in legitimizing some policies in the U.S. Some states withhold welfare payments 
from single mothers, and their children often pay the price. Voters in California 
supported Proposition 187, which punished the children of illegal immigrants by 
barring them from public schools. At one time the Clinton Administration punished 
foreign companies operating in Cuba by barring both executives and their children 
from visiting or studying in the U.S.'j4 There have also been proposals to punish 
parents for the misdeeds of their children as a means of reducing juvenile delin- 
quency. I must admit, however, that I feel uncomfortable with such policies. 
WANC:SO do I. Family-based punishment can easily be abused. But the problem 
of corruption is so serious in China-and much can be traced to the misuses of 
family connections in political circles-that I think it's worth thinking about the 
possibility of invoking family-based punishment as a means of minimizing corrup- 
tion in the political system. I hope I'm wrong, however. If term limits work out in 
practice, and if a combination of publicity, public deliberations, high salaries, and 
harsh penalties directed solely at the perpetrator of financial misdeeds can success- 
fully reduce corruption to a tolerable level, then family-based punishments may not 
be necessary. They should only be employed as a last res01-t.~~ 
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[The Question of  Universalizability~ 
DEMO: [Pause] Let's assume for the sake of argument that your proposal for a House 
of Scholars does indeed fulfill your expectations. It's composed of persons with the 
potential to act as "guardians" of virtue and knowledge governing in the interests of 
the common good, while various constitutional and anticorruption devices serve to 
curb the tendency to abuse power. Let's assume as well that this system of "rule by 
an intellectual elite" is  particularly appropriate for addressing the increasingly com- 
plex and inter-linked political problems of modern societies. Now let me ask you the 
following question. Why do you seem to think that the House of Scholars proposal is 
only appropriate for China? Why shouldn't it be adopted by the political systems of 
all modern and modernizing societies? 
WANG: I suspect that my proposal would be laughed out of existence in certain 
contexts. It seems appropriate in a Chinese context where most twentieth-century 
pro-democracy movements were initiated and carried out by the intellectual elite.66 
They weren't campaigning for pure democratic rule, but rather for "people's rule" 
constrained by the wisdom of a public-spirited intellectual elite. In other contexts, 
however, different groups played a greater role in democratization movements, and 
a "House of Scholars" may not satisfy their aspirations. Equally important, the House 
of Scholars can seem legitimate in the eyes of those Chinese people "on the bottom," 
because of our tradition of respect for meritocratically chosen scholar-officials. But 
things are different elsewhere. Think of the United States, with its deeply rooted anti- 
intellectualism, its tradition of popular resentment against "pointy-headed" intellec-
tuals. When I'm in East Asian societies built on a foundation of Confucian ideals, 
and I tell taxi drivers I'm a professor of political philosophy, they almost invariably 
ask for my views on the burning political issues of the day.67 In the U.S., they typi- 
cally scoff and proceed to inform me that I know nothing about the "real world." So 
I doubt that a House of Scholars could ever achieve much popular legitimacy in the 
U.S. 
DEMO: But there's more than one side to American popular culture. You yourself 
pointed out that the U.S Supreme Court-composed largely of brilliant academic 
overachievers-may be the most respected institution in the American political sys- 
tem. And, come to think of it, at least one leading American intellectual has floated a 
proposal not altogether dissimilar from your own. Are you familiar with Daniel Bell? 
WANG: YOU mean the distinguished American sociologist? 
DEMO: Of course. About ten years ago Bell developed a highly imaginative pro- 
posal for political reform of the U.S. Congress. The main problem with this institu- 
tion, as you may know, is that its members, particularly in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, are constantly scrambling to raise money for reelection, leading to the 
impression, if not the reality, that politicians are primarily beholden to financial 
interests instead of being committed to promoting the common good. So to "re- 
legitimize" the Congress in the eyes of the American public, Bell proposed setting a 
term limit for members of Congress-three terms for senators, and four terms of four 
(rather than two) years for representatives. Then retirees would be recruited into a 
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"third chamber," whose pension plus an additional income would give them finan- 
cial security. This "House of Counselors," as Bell puts it, would be the pool for the 
commissions and independent bodies that evaluate policy and advise the govern- 
ment. The country would thus have a group of experienced and disinterested indi- 
viduals ready to act for the common good, backed by a certain degree of popular 
support.68 I remember Bell's proposal well because my organization came close to 
endorsing the "House of Counselors" proposal a couple of years ago. We thought it 
was a better idea than, say, having the president's wife devise plans for long-term 
health-care policy. 
WANG: I don't fully understand the American political system, but wouldn't 
the implementation of this proposal require fairly radical changes in the U.S. 
Constitution? 
DEMO:Yes, that's one reason we finally decided not to go along. But who knows, 
Bell's idea may come to fruition one day if the Congress continues to lose the trust of 
the American public. 
WANG:[Short pause] Bell's idea is  actually quite different from what I have in 
mind. The "House of Counselors" may still be composed of mediocre people whose 
sole qualification is that they succeeded in getting elected to Congress. I'm after truly 
disinterested men and women of talent who haven't had to demean themselves by 
pandering to the rich and powerful, or to the short-term concerns of the public. A 
closer "Western" analog, though in a somewhat watered-down form, is the House of 
Lords in the U.K. 
DEMO:[Surprised] The House of Lords! 
WANG: Yes. Contrary to popular belief, the House of Lords still has considerable 
impact on legislation. It has the power to delay bills passed by the House of Com- 
mons for one year, though it rarely exercises this power. More commonly, it operates 
as a revising body, refining bills from the lower chamber by filling in the details and 
closing the loopholes. And, from what I hear, it performs that task with admirable 
competence and nonpartisanship. Its debates are elegant, non-adversarial, and infor- 
mative, and they sometimes lead to significant amendments. Many of its members 
have a depth of expertise from earlier careers that's often lacking in the relative 
youngsters occupying the House of common^.^^ 
DEMO: But it includes hereditary peers, who inherit the right to sit there and vote 
on legislation simply on the basis of their aristocratic ancestry. That's not what you 
want for your House of Scholars, is it? 
WANG: Of  course not. But didn't Blair's Labour government get rid of hereditary 
peers170 Other peers are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the 
prime minister, and this seems to be a relatively meritocratic process. The respected 
political philosopher Raymond Plant, for example, is  a member of the House of 
Lords. But you're right, it should be reformed and made into a truly meritocratic 
body. If it were up to me, I'd convert it into a House of Scholars, composed of rep- 
resentatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations. 
DEMO: Maybe your proposal is most appropriate for the United Kingdom? 
WANC: I doubt it. There isn't a cultural base of support for a House of Scholars in 
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the United K ingd~m.~ '  Of course there's an English tradition of deference to one's 
"betters," but the meritocratic idea of "rule of the best" is  tainted with notions of 
property and class privilege in a way that hasn't been true in Confucian-influenced 
East Asia. I'm suspicious of sentimental readings of history, but, generally speaking, 
you did have a fair and open examination process in Confucian societies, and 
examinations have often been seen as a vehicle for upward mobility.'* 
DEMO: In that case, why not recommend a House of Scholars for Korea, Japan, 
Singapore, and Taiwan? You've already said, for example, that your proposal com- 
pensates for flaws in the Japanese system of de facto rule by powetful bureaucrats, 
such as the lack of transparency and accountability, so why shouldn't a House of 
Scholars be appropriate for Japan? 
WANC: Maybe one day other East Asian societies will be attracted by my pro- 
posal. If the political status quo isn't seen to be working well, it might be the right 
time to propose this kind of change.73 In China there's an obvious need for serious 
political reform, and people seem to be quite receptive to new political ideas. 
DEMO: [Pause] I'm slowly coming around to your view. Perhaps I can ask you a 
couple more questions, if you don't mind. I realize I've been suggesting that you 
should consider expanding the scope of your proposal to countries other than China, 
but now let me suggest that you're being too.ambitious by proposing to apply the 
House of Scholars idea to the whole of China. China, as you know, is  not a culturally 
homogeneous entity. This means, for one thing, that non-Han Chinese minority 
groups may not identify with a Confucian tradition of rule by a meritocratically 
selected political elite, and it seems unfair to ask them to participate in your scheme. 
WANG: I have no objections to granting substantial self-administration to minority 
areas like Tibet and Xinjiang. With respect to the House of Scholars, minority groups 
can be guaranteed a certain number of seats. Hong Kong can also be given a seat, 
and Taiwan, if it agrees to join, can be given three or four seats.74 
DEMO:My point is that the practice of competition for political office on the basis 
of written examinations may seem "foreign" to some non-Han Chinese groups, and 
they may not support this method of selecting political rulers. 
WANC: There are ways to accommodate the cultural particularities of minority 
groups. Minorities can choose a different selection process for their deputies. Or they 
can modify the content of examinations to better reflect their own traditions; for 
example, the examination for Tibetan representatives can include a component 
on Buddhism and the Tibetan language. These are details to be worked out at 
tomorrow's convention. 
[The Problem of Gridlock] 
DEMO:[Pause] One last question. So far we've only been talking about the upper 
house in your proposed bicameral legislature. The lower house, you said, should be 
composed of democratically elected representatives. But the two houses may not 
always agree on the same policies. 
WANG: Of course. 
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DEMO: SO my question is the following: how would you resolve disputes between 
the lower house and the upper house? Is there a mechanism to break gridlock 
between the two houses of government? 
WANG: A tough question. But the answer ultimately depends on which of the two 
houses has more power. Proponents of rule by a meritocratic elite-let's call them 
l l C ~ n f ~ ~ i a n ~ l l - w ~ ~ l dwant to empower the House of Scholars. 
DEMO: If you really want to be a Confucian, then you'd want the top power 
broker to be an Emperor, who stands above the fray. After all, the Head of State 
in traditional China was a "divinely appointed" Sage-King, and meritocratically 
selected civil servants had the role of advising, and perhaps admonishing, but they 
weren't the top decision makers. So why not try to resurrect the monarchic Chinese 
tradition? 
WANG: [Laughs] Don't be silly. That would never work: it's difficult, if not im- 
possible, to resurrect a monarchical system that's been dead for nearly a century. It's 
not like you can make people believe in a "divinely appointed" ruler who emerges 
from a constitutional convention. And besides, nobody's pushing for that system 
now. What's more realistic, I think, is to select the Head of State from the House of 
Scholars. Perhaps it can be the eldest member, or if you really want to be merito- 
cratic it can go to the top achiever in the examinations. What's your advice? 
DEMO: TO be frank, I don't like either option. In my opinion, the House of 
Scholars should be constitutionally subordinate to the democratic lower house. Like 
Bell's House of Counselors, it could be the pool for the commissions and indepen- 
dent bodies that evaluate policy and advise the government. Like the House of 
Lords, it could play the relatively minor role of revising legislation passed on from 
the lower house, pointing out flaws and proposing small amendments. I don't mind if 
a "symbolic," largely ceremonial, Head of State comes from the House of Scholars, 
but the Head of Government-the one who really makes the political decisions- 
should come from the lower house. And so should the important ministers. 
WANG:[Face whitens] But, but, I thought you were on my side! 
DEMO: I am! Like I said, I'm not against a House of Scholars. I agree with your 
point that it seems to suit China's political culture and that it's better than alternative 
mechanisms for institutionalizing rule by an intellectual elite. But I can only go so 
far. I can't endorse a political system that gives unelected leaders the power to make 
final decisions. Elected politicians can-and should-rely on the advice of talented 
and disinterested individuals, but "the people's" chosen leaders should hold the 
ultimate trump cards. 
WANG: But that would be a disaster in China! Democrats in the lower house- 
concerned primarily about the next election and heavily influenced by commercial 
interests-may favor rapid economic growth regardless of the long-term ecological 
consequences, whereas deputies in the House of Scholars-who arrive at their 
decisions following careful, nonpartisan deliberations, unconstrained by the need 
to accommodate particular interests-may opt for slower, ecologically sustainable 
development without the same immediate material benefits. Who should win? The 
democrats? 
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DEMO: It's hard to answer in the abstract. Policy disputes tend to be more con- 
crete than that. 
WANG: O.K., let's take the example of the one-child-per-family policy. Most 
peasants oppose this policy, partly due to the deeply held rural preference for siring 
male children. Those views would probably dominate the lower house-the large 
majority of Chinese still live in the countryside-and the democrats may well vote to 
repeal this policy, whatever the long-term consequences. But a House of Scholars- 
dominated by intellectuals, most of whom understand the need for this 
would probably vote to uphold it. And you think the democrats should get their way? 
DEMO:You're presenting this as an "either-or" issue: the vulgar democrats versus 
the reflective "meritocrats." But surely some meritocrats wil l side with the democrats 
in the lower house. Even if they're completely selfless, meritocrats won't necessarily 
converge on the same interpretation of the common good. 
WANG: Of  But conflicts can be resolved by majority decision making, 
and the question is what to do when a majority in the upper house is opposed by a 
majority in the lower house. I'd favor-for example-a constitutional formula pro- 
viding supermajorities in the House of Scholars with the right to override majorities 
in the lower house. 
DEMO: [Raises voice] Well, I'd favor the opposite. And I doubt most Chinese 
would go along with a system that's designed to systematically override the wishes 
of the leaders they choose to represent their own interests! It's not like you're asking 
them to endorse an institution like the Supreme Court, which has carefully circum- 
scribed powers. They're supposed to accept an institution that has overriding power, 
in principle, over all the decisions of democratically elected leaders! 
WANG: [Short pause] Mmm, yes, you have a point. It would be hard to sell that 
part.77 
DEMO:And you don't have to! Even a constitutionally subordinate upper house 
could play an important role in China. The country would have a group of relatively 
talented and disinterested individuals adding wisdom and long-term planning to the 
decision-making process. And if the House is legitimate in the "eyes of the people" 
-which is  quite likely in a society with a tradition of respect for a meritocratically 
chosen political elite-the House of Scholars can exercise a great deal of moral 
authority. Democratic majorities would find it hard to ignore the points of view that 
emerge from open deliberation among deputies in the House of Scholars. At the very 
least, politicians in the lower house who systematically disregard policy recom-
mendations of the House of Scholars may find it difficult to get reelected.78 What I'm 
trying to say is that you don't need much constitutional support to have a powerful 
House of Scholars! 
[Implementation of the Proposal] 
WANG: [Pause] Yes, you may be right. I guess I'd be satisfied with a constitutionally 
subordinate House of Scholars. The important point is that the House's decisions 
have real, practical impact in the political arena. 
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DEMO: Well, that would also depend on other factors, such as the relationship 
between the House of Scholars and the j~d i c ia ry . ' ~  
WANG: Of course. There are many such "details" to be ironed out during the 
course of deliberations at the constitutional c o n v e n t i ~ n . ~ ~  First, however, I have to 
deal with a more immediate problem. I'm really worried about the possibility that I 
won't get enough votes for a House of Scholars, even one with minimal powers. The 
Communists-or the "Liberal Democrats," as they now prefer to call themselves- 
favor the electoral process, and they have no interest in a House of Scholars. They 
learned from the Russian case that their pervasive bureaucratic apparatus could 
easily be converted into a powerful electoral machinery. The ex-dissidents, espe- 
cially the younger ones, also favor a powerful, democratically elected legislature. 
They're quite sure they can get elected, following in the footsteps of the Mandelas 
and the Havels. I don't blame them, mind you. I've always admired their courage 
over the years, and I think they deserve political payback of some kind or other. But 
meanwhile I have to deal with the fact that it's not in the interest of any of the major 
political forces to support my proposal. The only weapon I have at my disposal is 
rational argumentation. 
DEMO:[Smiles] That's not very promising, is it? 
WANC: NO. This is real politics, unfortunately-not an academic seminar. Still, 
not all is lost. I think I can get some support from the women's groups: they like the 
idea of examinations that wil l have the effect of increasing the proportion of women 
in the political process. And there's one Marxist delegate-perhaps the only genuine 
Marxist in China-who may go along, because he's worried about the possibility 
that a democratically elected legislature wil l be captured by big business interests. 
DEMO: That's it? 
WANC: Well, 1 have to try to get more support from the democrats. If all else fails, 
I have one final argument up my sleeve: the "lesson" of Russia's transition to de- 
mocracy. After the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russians were confronted with a stark 
choice: either communist stagnation, or progress in the form of Western-style politi- 
cal practices. They might have gone along for a while if democracy had delivered 
material goods and provided social peace. But things didn't go according to plan, 
and not surprisingly it turned out that Western-style democracy had fairly shallow 
roots in the country. Can we really blame the Russian people? It's humiliating for a 
people-especially if they feel part of an old and proud civilization-to jettison the 
past as a whole, to be told that nothing valuable can be found in their national po- 
litical history. So when things go wrong, when democracy fails to meet people's 
aspirations, the temptation will be to turn to a strongman who promises to restore 
national pride. But all this can be avoided if a democratic system incorporates an 
element of traditional political culture. Citizens will bear with the system even when 
things go wrong, and they can't put all the blame on the evil machinations of 
foreigners. 
DEMO: SO what you're saying is that Russian democracy was unstable because 
no serious effort was made to incorporate traditional political characteristics into 
their political system.81 To avoid this mistake in the case of China, you're offering a 
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middle way between Confucianism and Western democracy, a "democracy with 
Chinese characteristics." 
WANG: Exactly. A House of Scholars designed to restrain democratic majorities 
can also have the paradoxical effect of securing a democratic system in China. Now 
let me ask you a question, if I may. I think it would help my case tomorrow if I can 
tell the delegates that your organization supports my proposal, at least the general 
idea of a bicameral legislature with a House of Scholars. I suspect that some of the 
"radical democrats" will try to portray my scheme as a reactionary plot concocted 
by sinister authoritarian forces.. . . 
DEMO: [Interrupting] But that's ridiculous. 
WANG: I know, but some of the younger ones are quite dogmatic; they won't 
even contemplate the possibility of a middle ground between traditional Chinese 
values and Western democracy. And for my proposal to pass even in its mildest 
form, I have to respond to all forms of criticism in an effective way. So if I say that 
even the U.S.-based National Council for Democracy endorses my proposal, this 
can help to undercut the arguments of "radical democrats." 
DEMO: Like I said, I can go along if the House of Scholars is  constitutionally 
subordinate to the lower, democratic house. 
WANG: Fair enough. 
DEMO: It's also in your interest to emphasize this part: you'd probably get more 
votes from the democrats if you make it explicit that the lower house has the ultimate 
say. 
WANG: Yes, good point. I think I'll do that. 
[At this point, PROFESSOR WANG gets up, and walks toward the wooden statue of 
Confucius in the far corner of his office. DEMO watches in amazement as PROFESSOR 
WANG gently unscrews Confucius' head, revealing a tray with a bottle of wuliangye 
and two small porcelain cups.] 
WANG: [Filling the cups] This, my friend, is high-quality stuff. 
DEMO:And potent, too? 
WANG: Yes, but my motivation is the pursuit of quality, not power. 
DEMO: It's nice to have both, wouldn't you say? 
WANG:[Handing DEMO a CUP] I won't deny that. But let's move on to more 
serious matters. 
DEMO: I agree. A toast to cross-cultural friendship. Ganbei! 
WANG: Ganbei! 
Notes 
Earlier versions of this article were presented as papers at the "The First Asia Sym- 
posium in Jurisprudence: Law in a Changing World," held at Tokyo University, 
October 1996; at a conference on "Human Rights and East Asia," held at the Uni- 
versity of Hong Kong, December 1996; and at a workshop on "Confucianism and 
Democracy," held in Jirae, Korea, June 1998. 1 am grateful for the audiences' ques- 
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I owe special thanks to Roger Ames, for being open to the dialogue form and to 
Andrew Nathan, for his detailed written comments. I owe most to Michael Walzer, 
who first inspired this proposal with the following comment, from Thick and Thin 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 59-60: 
I recognized in the arguments of the students [in Tiananmen Square in 19891 a sense of 
their mission or their special political role that was clearly incompatible with the 
American [democratic] ideal (in which a certain hostility to the claims of the educated 
classes has always been present) and probably incompatible too with the prevailing 
abstract and universal theories. Student elitism was rooted, perhaps, in Leninist van- 
guard politics or, more likely, in pre-communist cultural traditions (Confucian, manda- 
rin) specific to China and certain to show up in any version of Chinese democracy. 
I asked myself, "what might this mean in practice?" and the result is  this essay in 
drama form. I would also like to thank Walzer for his written comments on the final 
product. 
1 -	While most of the contributors to a symposium addressing the question "Will 
China Democratize?" "find themselves unable to identify any groups that are 
sufficiently powerful, motivated, and aligned to produce the democratic 
changes that supposedly are inevitable," Andrew Nathan notes that "several 
contributors acknowledge China's history of surprising political eruptions and 
breakthroughs, and point to the ever-present possibility of surprises" (Nathan, 
"Even Our Caution Must Be Hedged," Journal o f  Democracy 9 [ I  I [January 
19981: 62, 63-64). 
2 -	See, for example, "Beijing Spring," Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 April 1998, 
pp. 20-22. Two periodicals-Reform Magazine and ResPublica-have pub-
lished articles calling for democratic reform. ResPublica published a Chinese- 
language translation of a short piece that presents this idea for a bicameral 
legislature with an upper House of Scholars ("A Confucian Democracy for the 
21st Century," ResPublica 4 (1997), pp. 378-392). The English version was 
published in Law in a Changing World: Asian Alternatives, ed. Morigiwa 
Yasutomo, Archiv fuer Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 72 (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972), pp. 37-49. 
3 -	Some observers did in fact predict this event. In 1986 Emmanuel Todd of the 
Paris National Institute for Demographic Research predicted "with clinical 
precision that the Soviet Union would soon disintegrate" (see Erazim Kohak, 
"The Search for Europe," Dissent, Spring 1996, p. 15). Peter Frank of the Uni- 
versity of Essex also predicted some of the events in the early 1990s along with 
their causes. But the more important point is that most political thinkers were 
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still working within the "realist" paradigm of how to deal with communist-type 
institutions at the time the Soviet empire collapsed instead of thinking in con- 
crete terms about what should come after communism, with the consequence 
that the options were narrowed to a choice between Western-style democracy 
and a "return to communism" (see the subsection below on "Implementation 
of the Proposal"). 
4 - See, for example, Yan Jiaqi, Toward a Democratic China (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai'i Press, 1989), chap. 17; Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Lon-
don: Tauris, 1986), p. 127; Orville Schell, Discos and Democracy (New York: 
Pantheon, 1988), p. 198. 
5 - Even some American "communitarians" tend to argue along these lines (i.e., 
community is seen as a means for liberty): see, for example, Benjamin Barber, 
"A Mandate for Liberty: Requiring Education-Based Community Service," in 
Rights and the Common Good, ed. Amitai Etzioni (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1 995), p. 194. 
6 -	The Federal Reserve Board also has direct influence on countries that peg their 
currencies to the U.S. dollar. As the Hong Kong Monetary Authority chief ex- 
ecutive Joseph Yam Chi-kwong (the highest-paid civil servant in Hong Kong) 
put it, "The cost of operating a fixed exchange rate system is  that you have 
conceded your sovereign right over monetary policy to the central bank of the 
currency to which you are linked. In our case it is Alan Greenspan [U.S. Fed- 
eral Reserve chairman] who determines monetary policy for us" (Peter Seidlitz 
and David Murphy, "Yam Calls for Asian Facility to End Crisis," South China 
Morning Post, 14 June 1998, Money section, p. 4). The German Bundesbank is  
arguably even more powetful, with the power to affect monetary policy in 
several European countries. It is also worth noting that the new British Labour 
government has empowered the U.K. Central Bank to set interest rates, on the 
grounds, as the chancellor of the Exchequer explained, that "politicians far too 
often [had been] setting policy to suit their needs, with the result that the British 
economy had been plagued by damaging cycles" (Erik Ibsen, "Labour 
Empowers U.K. Central Bank to Set Interest Rate," International Herald Trib- 
une, 7 May 1997, p. 10). 
7 -	See, for example, John Cassidy, "Fleeing the Fed," New Yorker, 19 February 
1996, pp. 45-46. The title of this article refers to Alan Blinder, who is supposed 
to have "fled the Fed" due to differences over the lack of transparency and 
accountability at the central bank, but it is interesting to note that Blinder has 
nonetheless written an article extolling the virtues of the Fed and arguing for 
the need to extend such "apolitical" decision-making bodies to other domains 
(Blinder, "Is Government Too Political?" Foreign Affairs 6 [41 [November/ 
December 19971: 1 15-1 26). "At the Federal Reserve," Blinder says, 
[plolicy discussions are serious, even somber, and disagreements are almost always 
over a policy's economic, social, or legal merits, not its political marketability. Overtly 
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partisan talk is deemed not just inappropriate, but ill-mannered. The attitudes of partic- 
ular legislators, interest groups, or political parties toward monetary policy are rarely 
mentioned, for they are considered irrelevant. And the Fed rarely discusses its "mes- 
sage." The Fed does not always make the right call, but its criteria are clearly apolitical. 
And its decisions are arguably better, on average, than those made in the political 
cauldron. (p. 1 1 7) 
Blinder adds that "what justifies assigning so much power to a small group of 
unelected officials" is the fact that monetary policy requires complex technical 
judgments best made by trained specialists and (most important) the fact that 
good policy decisions require patience, a long time horizon, and (sometimes) 
short-term pain-qualities not normally associated with "short-sighted politi- 
cians with their eyes on elections"-and these same arguments apply "just as 
forcefully to many other areas of government policy," such as "health policy 
(should we spend more on cancer or AIDS research?), tax policy (should we 
reduce taxes on capital gains?), or environmental policy (how should we cope 
with damage to the ozone layer?)" (p. 11 8). 
The main problem with Blinder's article is that he conflates nonpartisan 
decision making with value-free technocratic decision making, which could 
not be further from the truth. He argues that "value judgements should be 
made democratically by elected officials [and] appointed professionals would 
design the means to achieve those ends, presumably choosing them on non- 
partisan, technocratic grounds" (p. 124), though he does seem to be aware of 
counterarguments (p. 126). In fact, decision-making bodies such as the Fed 
cannot avoid making value judgments (e.g., who benefits and who loses from 
monetary policy), and part of the justification for insulating these bodies from 
the decisions of elected politicians is precisely the fact (hope?) that they can 
make better decisions than politicians from a moral point of view-for exam-
ple, by doing more to consider the interests of minorities, future generations, 
foreigners, and others affected by their policies. (On the need "to give attention 
to the claims of everyone who might be affected by their political actions," see 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement [Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 19961, p. 227 and chaps. 4 and 6. Gutmann 
and Thompson, however, seem to place too much faith in the ability and will- 
ingness of elected politicians to look after the interests of non-constituents; see 
my chapter "Implementing Deliberative Democracy in East Asia," in Stephen 
Macedo's edited book Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Dis- 
agreement [New York: Oxford University Press, 19991, pp. 70-87). 
8 - Ronald Dworkin suggests that the "anti-majoritarian" Supreme Court is  demo-
cratic (as opposed to acting as a constraint on the decisions of elected politi- 
cians), not simply because ultimately the people could override a Court deci- 
sion by amending the Constitution, but also because people realize that the 
majority needs to be restrained in certain circumstances and so support the 
Supreme Court and its role as constitutional watchdog (Dworkin, Freedom's 
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Law [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19961, p. 16). Dworkin can make 
this move because he defines democracy not as decision making by elected 
politicians but rather as decision making that treats "all members of the com- 
munity, as individuals, with equal concern and respect," but he provides no 
reason for the argument that this "alternate account of the aim of democracy 
. . . [dlemands much the same structure of government as the majoritarian 
premise does" (p. 1 7) if less-than-democratic institutions composed of unelected 
decision makers such as the House of Scholars can feasibly do a better job at 
treating people with equal concern and respect compared to political institu- 
tions composed of elected politicians. In my view, Dworkin should "come 
clean" and admit that he is really talking about justice, not democracy, and 
that (like Wang and Alan Blinder) he would favor more constraints on the 
powers of democratically elected politicians if this can achieve the end of 
securing more justice. 
9 -	Consider the following reflections by Robert Reich, the U.S. Secretary of Labor 

from 1992 to 1996 : "only he [Alan Greenspan, the chief of the U.S. Federal 

Reserve Bank] has the power to raise or lower short-term interest rates. Like 

Paul Volcker, the Fed chief before him, Greenspan can put the economy in a 

tailspin simply by tightening his grip. Volcker did it in 1979, and Jimmy Carter 

was fired. Bill Clinton knows that. Greenspan has the most important grip in 

town: Bill's balls, in the palm of his hand" (Reich, "Locked in the Cabinet," 

New Yorker, 21 April 1997, pp. 44-45). 

10 - See, for example, Karel Van Wolferen, The Enigma ofjapanese Power (London: 
Macmillan, 1 989). 
11 -	See, for example, Benjamin Fulford, "Japan's Reluctant Reformers Basking in 
the Status Quo," South China Morning Post, 7 July 1998, Business section, p. 5. 
For a book-length indictment of the Ministry of Finance's failures from the late 
1 980s to the late 1 9 9 0 ~ ~  see Peter Hartcher, The Ministry: How japan's Most 
Powerful Institution Endangers World Markets (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1 998). 
12 -	See Sheryl WuDunn, "Japan's Bureaucrats Fumble away the Traditional Center 
of Power," International Herald Tribune, 7 May 1996, p. 4. 
13 - Unless otherwise indicated, I rely on Arthur Waley's translation, The Analects 
of Confucius (London: Allen and Unwin, 1 938). 
14 -	According to Bruce Brooks, however, the person we refer to as "Confucius" 
was probably directly responsible only for the ideas expressed in Book 4 of the 
Analects, and an interest in the well-being of the populace does not appear 
until Book 12, which may date to more than 150 years after the death of Con- 
fucius (Brooks, The Original Analects [New York: Columbia University Press, 
19971; 1 thank Chris Fraser for bringing this reference to my attention). What- 
ever the truth of this argument, the fact remains that the dominant interpretation 
Daniel A. Bell 485 
of Confucianism transmitted over the past two thousand years has valued 
public service as the highest of life's achievements. 
15 - It is worth noting, however, that many aspiring scholar-officials opted for 
Daoism only after they failed the civil service examinations, which suggests 
that public service would have been their first choice. 
16 -	See Merle Goldman, "Politically Engaged Intellectuals in the Deng-Jiang Era: A 
Changing Relationship with the Party-State," China Quarterly, 1996, p. 38. 
17 -	When we think about the (un)likelihood of the "American" equivalent-a few 
dozen students from Harvard and MIT leading a massive movement for social 
change with the enthusiastic support and participation of a million working- 
class Bostonians-it becomes clear just how distinctive the Chinese value of 
respect for rule by an intellectual elite really seems to be. 
18 -	As Tu Wei-ming puts it, "the Confucian scholar-official mentality still functions 
in the psychocultural construct of East Asian societies" (see Tu's edited book 
Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity [Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 19961, p. 15. See also Ronald Dore, "Elitism and Democracy," La Revue 
Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review 14 121 [ I  9931: p. 70). 
19 -	See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. J.M. Cohen (Harmonds- 
worth, England: Penguin, 1953), pp. 327-328. 
20 -	See Michael Hil l and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citi- 
zenship in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 192. 
21 -	See "Village Committees: The Link between Economic and Political Reform," 
China Development Briefing, issue 4 (January 1997): 1 8-20. 
According to Vivienne Shue, democracy movement leaders such as Fang Lizhi 
"have expressed only horror at a democratic formula that would give equal 
voting rights to peasants" ("China: Transition Postponed?" Problems of Com- 
munism, January-April 1992, p. 163). In a recent survey of proposals for 
political reform in China, Andrew Nathan notes that he is "not aware of any 
proposal to move to one-man-one-vote." The possibility of a farmer-dominated 
legislature has led some reformers to endorse the current system of malap- 
portionment, which favors urban over rural voters ("China's Constitutionalist 
Option," lournal of Democracy 7 141 [October 19961: 48). 
23 -	See "A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, 
and the Straits Ti'mes (Singapore), 30 July 1994. 
24 -	See John Stuart Mill, "Considerations on Representative Government," in Three 
Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), chap. 8. 
25 -	See Richard Arneson, "Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels," 
in David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John Roemer, eds., The Idea of Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 137. 
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26 - I thank Joe Lau for this point. 
27 -	See G. W. F. Hegel, Elements o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, ed. Allen Wood, 
trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 ). 
28 - See Steven Smith, Hegel's Critique o f  Liberalism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), p. 142. 
29 - O n  Hegel's conception of freedom, see Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern 
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
30 -	According to Steven Smith, however, Hegel's form of liberal corporatism is 
"probably closest to the contemporary experiences of Scandinavia, France, and 
Britain, with their highly structured relations between interest organizations 
and administrative bodies" (Hegel's Critique o f  Liberalism, p. 145). But Western 
European-style "corporatism" still includes a house of government composed 
of representatives elected by individuals rather than groups. 
31 -	The post-handover authorities slashed the number of eligible voters for func- 
tional constituencies by 2.5 million (the last British Governor of Hong Kong, 
Chris Patten, had broadened the groupings of most constituencies to include 
ordinary employees), but it is interesting to note that the "democrats" did not 
always favor widening the electorate for the functional constituencies: when 
the "pro-China" DAB proposed amending the social welfare functional con- 
stituency to include kaifongassociations and other nonprofit providers of social 
services, they were opposed by the democrats, apparently because these new 
groups were less inclined to vote for them. More generally, "political parties 
were acting out of naked self-interest by introducing amendments [altering the 
composition of the functional constituencies] to boost their power" ("Poll 
Change Approved," South China Morning Post, 28 September 1997, p. 1). This 
suggests that it is  difficult, if not impossible, to determine the composition of 
eligible voters for functional constituencies (and to draw the line between 
functional constituencies) in a way that avoids political controversy and avoids 
undermining the moral credibility of a "corporatist" legislature. To be fair to the 
democrats, however, they favor scrapping the whole functional-constituency 
system in favor of a one-person-one-vote legislature. 
32 -	See Norman Miners, The Government and Politics o f  Hong Kong, 5th ed. 
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1 1 1-1 17. 
33 - See John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in Three Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), p. 28. 
34 -	See, for example, "A Censor Accuses a Eunuch," in Patricia Buckley Ebrey, 
ed., Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, 2d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993), 
pp. 263-266. 
35 -	See my article, "A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism: The Case of 
Singapore," Political Theory 25 (1 ) (February 1997), esp. pp. 9-1 6. 
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36 - Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, pp. 11 7-1 18. 
37 - "Lone Voice in a Tame Wilderness," South China Morning Post, 17 May 1998, 
p. 11. 
38 - See D. C. Lau's translation, The Analects (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 74. 
39 -	See Joseph Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights," in Joanne 
Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 212-240. 
40 - Mencius, "On Government," in Ebrey, Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, 
p. 23. However, it is also possible to interpret this passage to mean that "the 
fellow Zhou" deserved to have his head cut off not because he didn't serve the 
people but because he was a bad person in a way that mattered to Mencius. 
"The people," in other words, may not have been the source of legitimacy in 
Mencius, but only its beneficiary and perhaps an operational indicator of its 
presence or absence (I thank Andrew Nathan for this point). 
41 - For an account of the "dark side" of Confucianism, see Ci Jiwei, "The Right, 
the Good, and Rights" (paper presented at a conference on "Confucianism and 
Human Rights," Beijing University, June 1998). 
42 -	See the Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, trans. Burton Watson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 108. 
43 - Similar provisions exist in contemporary Korea. For example, article 155 of the 
Criminal Law "guarantees exemption from punishment for the crimes of sup- 
pression of evidence, concealment and forgery or alteration of the evidence in 
criminal cases if such acts were committed by a relative, head of the house, or 
a family member living with the said person, for the benefit of the criminal." 
While such laws "may be explained as a means of securing a fair trial, they 
could also be explained as remnants of Confucian family ethics which protect 
the intimacy of family relations" (Oh Byung-Sun, "Cultural Values and Human 
Rights: The Korean Perspective," in Jefferson R. Plantilla and Sebasti L. Raj, SJ, 
eds., Human Rights in Asian Cultures: Continuity and Change [Osaka: Hurights 
Osaka, 19971, p. 235). 
44 -	See Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, Law in Imperial China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 40. 
45 -	See Albert Chen, "Confucian Legal Culture and Its Modern Fate" (unpublished 
manuscript), p. 17. 
46 -	This is  not to suggest that each Confucian value, taken by itself, can encourage 
disobedience and foster a critical spirit: for example, an ethic of filial piety wil l 
not breed a critical spirit if the ruler does not require a person to act wrongly 
toward his or her parents (I thank Michael Walzer for this point). But, taken 
together with other values-such as Mencius' idea that the use of force is 
justified to overthrow an emperor who has violated the "Heavenly Mandate"; 
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the ruler's obligation to provide for the welfare of the people above all else; the 
idea that conformity to norms and rituals must come "from inside" (see Philip 
J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation [New York: Peter Lang, 19931, 
pp. 12-1 3); and the preference for persuasion and transformative education 
over coercion as a means to achieve social and political order (see David L. 
Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius [Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 19871, pp. 169-1 70)-Confucianism did provide a philos- 
ophy that always (or nearly always) coexisted uneasily with the political status 
quo. 
47 -	See Huang Zongxi, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince, trans. Wm. 
Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
48 - See de Bary, "lntroduction," in ibid., p. 7 
49 - See ibid., pp. xi-xii. 
50 - See Nathan, Chinese Democracy, p. 68. 
51 - This is de Bary's term in his "lntroduction," in Waiting for the Dawn, p. 83. 
52 - De Bary also makes this point in ibid., p. 55 
53 -	The same criticism can be made of Sun Yat-sen's proposed constitution of five 
separate powers, which includes an independent branch responsible for setting 
civil service examinations. Under Sun's proposed scheme, all public officials, 
including those elected to the legislature, "must pass examinations before 
assuming office" (Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen: Prescriptions for Saving 
China, ed. J. L. Lee, R. h. Myers, and D. G. Gillin [Stanford: Hoover Press, 
19941, p. 49). Sun hoped to avoid "the corruption and laxity of American pol- 
itics," where "those endowed with eloquence ingratiated themselves with the 
public and won elections, while those who had learning and ideals but lacked 
eloquence were ignored" (ibid.), but the effect would be to exclude from politi- 
cal power elected politicians who failed examinations. It is  difficult to imagine 
that a government that completely excluded the "people's chosen leaders" 
could achieve much legitimacy in the "eyes of the people" (consider a situa- 
tion where someone elected with 80 percent of the vote who fails examinations 
is replaced by a successful examination candidate who received only 20 per- 
cent of the vote). 
54 - It is  interesting to note, however, that it is  not uncommon in "Confucian" 
countries such as Japan and Korea for defendants to be tried in court cases 
before judges in their twenties. In Korea, for example, judges need only to pass 
the bar exam and then go through a two-year program at the Legal Training 
Institute run by the Ministry of Justice, with the consequence that young per- 
sons in their twenties may preside as judges in Korea's courts. However, this 
may be the result of having adopted the "German-style" civil law tradition (as 
opposed to the "Confucian" emphasis on examinations as a means for select- 
ing decision makers), and the Korean government is  currently trying to mitigate 
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until they serve some years as lawyers or prosecutors (I thank Hahm Chaibong 
for this information). 
55 - Examinations for high-ranking members of the civil service in Hong Kong 
similarly test for the ability to "look at both sides" of controversial political 
Issues. 
56 -	Winston Churchill's (apocryphal?) quip about democracy-that it's the worst 
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the examination system as a procedure for identifying decision makers of talent 
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ical?" p. 126). 
58 -	According to Professor Onuma Yasuaki, however, Tokyo University is trying to 
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tions for the university entrance examinations. 
59 - If the minimum age is  moved too high, it can be argued that not many "senior 
citizens," particularly those successful at other careers, wil l be willing to sit 
through a rigorous examination process. One solution might be to let thirty- 
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1996, p. 18. The New York Times is critical of this law, asking "How far, one 
wonders, does guilt by kinship extend?" 
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490 Philosophy East & West 
the sons and daughters of public officials, but that the children only be pun- 
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Press, 1995), p. 3. 
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one of the most prestigious in Korea, as this represents the model of the noble 
man" (Kim, "The Reproduction of Confucian Culture in Contemporary Korea: 
An Anthropological Study," in Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Traditions in East 
Asian Modernity, p. 206). 
68 -	See Daniel Bell, "The Old  War: After Ideology, Corruption," New Republic, 23 
and 30 August 1993, pp. 20-21. 
69 -	See John Darnton, "Labor Peers into the Lords' Future," International Herald 
Tribune, 22 April 1996, pp. 1, 8. 
70 -	See Simon Macklin, "House of Lords to Oust Hereditary Peers," South China 
Morning Post, 11 June 1998, p. 14. 
71 -	The "cultural terrain" for a House of Scholars may be relatively favorable in 
France, given the social and political importance of French intellectuals. If the 
Fifth Republic experiences a serious political or constitutional crisis, perhaps a 
House of Scholars can be considered as a constitutional proposal for a "Sixth 
Republic." 
72 -	According to He Huai Hong, this perception was often grounded in fact; that is, 
civil service examinations did often serve as a vehicle for upward social mo- 
bility (and downward social mobility for established families that could not 
produce successful offspring). See his "Rujia de pingdeng guan jiqi zhiduhua" 
(Confucianism's equality and its institutionalization) (paper presented at a 
conference on "Confucianism and Human Rights," Beijing University, June 
1998). It is  also worth noting that standardized (blindly graded) testing has also 
been an instrument of upward mobility in France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States (see Adrian Woodridge, "A True Test," New Republic, 15 June 
1998, pp. 20-2 1 ). 
73 - It may be worth noting that several persons (including myself) are currently 
involved in a project to draft a constitution for a Confucian democracy (meant 
to be particularly relevant for Korea), which may include this proposal for an 
upper House of Scholars. This effort is part of a multi-year series of workshops 
on Confucianism and democracy, organized by Professor Hahm Chaibong of 
Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea. 
74 - Minority groups can also be guaranteed representation in the democratic lower 
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house, as in Yan Jiaqi's proposal for a federal system in post-Communist China 
(see his article "China's National Minorities and Federalism," Dissent, Summer 
1996). More generally, it is worth emphasizing that the House of Scholars 
proposal is fully compatible with federal constitutional mechanisms regulating 
the relationship between national and provincial institutions: in fact, those 
favoring more local autonomy may have an interest in supporting a proposal 
for a House of Scholars, because deputies in the House of Scholars bound by 
term limits may be more likely to ensure that decisions at the local level are 
not usurped by national political institutions (in contrast to relatively "power- 
hungry" bureaucrats with lifetime tenure and ambitious politicians concerned 
about the next election). 
75 - See note 63 above. 
It is worth noting, however, that not every Chinese intellectual wil l readily 
admit the possibility that different persons can (justifiably) settle upon different 
interpretations of the common good. According to Thomas Metzger, many 
Chinese intellectuals, including self-described liberals, seem to believe that 
"specific normative problems can all be solved in an objective way based on 
"reason"; that the ultimate nature of all things . . . can be known; and that all 
knowledge can be organized to form a single unified system of thought which 
an enlightened elite can then use to guide society" (Thomas Metzger, "On 
Chinese Tendencies Resisting Democratization" [paper included in folder dis- 
tributed to participants of a workshop on "Confucianism and Democracy," 
June 1998, Jirae, Korea], p. 6). This outlook can pose a problem for a political 
institution that depends on the willingness of members to abide by the deci- 
sions of the majority in cases of conflict between competing interpretations of 
the common good. 
77 - Perhaps Wang could have suggested the possibility of a referendum, to gauge 
"the people's" support for a House of Scholars with the power to override the 
decisions of a democratic lower house. But this may be asking Wang to take 
a needless risk, since it may be preferable to settle for a purely advisory House 
of Scholars that is not put to a referendum. And even if the majority votes for 
a powerful House of Scholars, the system may not be stable for the long term, 
as future (more educated?) generations may come to object to this political 
arrangement. 
Another possibility would be to give majorities in the upper house the power 
to override majorities in the lower house, but then allowing a supermajority 
(say, two-thirds of the representatives) in the lower house to override majorities 
in the upper house. This way, the upper house could exercise more de facto 
power, but the "ultimate" power would still lie with the "people's" represen-
tatives in the lower house. It is unlikely, however, that democrats could accept 
a proposal that effectively disempowers the lower house to this extent. 
78 - This leads to the question of whether representatives of the lower house should 
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also be subject to term limits. If they are not, an upper house whose members 
are limited to seven or eight years may not be able to stand up to a lower house 
whose members are longtime insiders. 
79 - If the House of Scholars plays a purely advisory role, perhaps it should delib- 
erate about public policies and legal judgments. But if it plays a more active 
decision-making role, there is more reason to worry about the need to separate 
the powers of the House of Scholars and the judiciary. 
80 -	Other important "details" include the question of scale (perhaps the House of 
Scholars should be limited to two or three hundred seats, so as to allow for 
high-quality deliberations), the question of how to further insulate members of 
the House of Scholars from political pressure (perhaps they should be barred 
from joining political parties and be forced to disclose publicly memberships 
with interest groups, similar to the mechanisms that help to ensure the integrity 
of federal judges in the U.S.), and the question of who should determine the 
content of the exams used to select deputies for the House of Scholars (perhaps 
a committee from the lower house should have the final say on the matter, 
which may help to alleviate the concerns of democrats; I thank Mak Tsz Kwan, 
a student from the "Theories of Society" class, University of Hong Kong, Spring 
1997, for this suggestion). 
81 -	One exception is Solzhenitsyn's 1991 pamphlet "How We Are to Rebuild 
Russia," which sought to rebuild Russian national pride by drawing on pre- 
revolutionary models (he proposed to recreate the elected district councils of 
prerevolutionary times and the Duma, the first Russian Parliament in 1905, and 
to revive the Orthodox Church), but without some of the antidemocratic and 
colonialist elements of Russian nationalism. This proposal never did gain 
widespread support, however-perhaps because it was paired in people's 
minds with Solzhenitsyn's oft-displayed hostility to secular, "consumerist" 
modernity. 
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